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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Conflict of Laws:,Adoption: What law governs the status lof parties.-
In Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York v. Benton et al., 34 F. Supp.
859 (W. D. Mo. 1940), a child was domiciled with her natural parents in
Rhode Island where, it was asserted, an oral agreement of adoption between
her natural parenfs and her alleged foster mother took place. She subse-
quently resided with the latter for ten years in Connecticut and thereafter,.
for a brief period, in Missouri. The testimony before the court made it clear
that the foster mother operated a house of ill repute of which the child was
an inmate. The present suit is arn attempt on the part of the latter to share
in the wealth accumulated by the foster mother from her various illegal
enterprises. Held: Since a parol contract of adoption is unenforceable and
forbidden in Rhode Island, and inasmuch as Missouri never had jurisdiction
over the status (the contract not having been performed in Missouri), a
federal court sitting in Missouri will not enforce the adoption contract nor
authorize a decree of adoption. The court made clear that it would have
awarded the decree if a (clearly established) parol contract had been made
within Missouri and there fully executed in a manner measuring up to the
moral and relational standards fixed by the law of Missouri. It would have
enforced the contract as an equitable right, despite the fact that neither the
child nor its natural parents were domiciled within the state.
Adoption is that act by which the relations of paternity and affiliation
are established as legally existing between persons not so related by nature.'
Although known to the Hebrews, Athenians, Babylonians, Greeks and
Romans, adoption was unknown to the common law and exists in the United
States only by virtue of statute.2 To date, all American jurisdictions have
statutes providing for adoption.3
The principle that the status of parties is governed by the lex domnicilli is
universally endorsed, 4 but frequently-and particularly in cases involving the
relation of adoption-its application is most problematical. In dealing with
an application to decree an adoption, the court may have to concern itself
with the domicile of the child, of its natural parents (who if divorced may
have separate domiciles), and of the adopter parent. Further, both the state
wherein the child is domiciled and the jurisdiction in which the foster parent
is domiciled should each "have their day in court"; the former to question
1TIFFANY, PERSONS AND DoiESTic RELATIONS (3d ed. 1921) § 115, p. 310. Morrison
v. Sessions' Estate, 70 Mich. 297, 38 N. W. 249, 14 Am. St. Rep. 500 (1888).2For a history of adoption, see Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321 (1880) ;
Betz v. Horr, 276 N. Y. 83, 11 N. E. (2d) 548 (1937), 114 A. L. R, 491 (1940);
Matter of Thorne, 155 N. Y. 140, 49 N. E. 661 (1898) ;.Note (1918) 4 CoRmELL L. Q.
203. Adoption in England dates only from 1926. 17 HALSBRY, LAws OF ENGLAND(2d ed. 1935) 679; Adoption of Children Act, 16 & 17 Geo. V, c. 29.
84 VRNIER, AmERICAN FAmIY LAWS (1st ed. 1936) 279.4Goodrich, Legitimatim and Adoption in the Conflict of Laws (1924) 22 Micir. L.
Ray. 638. Section 142 of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws reads: "The status of
adoption is created by; either: (a) the law of the state of domicil of the adopted child;
or (b) the law of the state of domicil of the adoptive parent if it has jurisdiction over
the person having! legal custody of the child or if the child is a waif and subject to thejurisdiction of the state."
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the character and fitness of the adopting parent, and the latter to determine
for itself whether the child is not a degenerate or whether the foster parent
is not irresponsible, for in either case, if adoption is permitted, the child is
likely to become a charge upon the state.8
Confining ourselves to the creation, rather than the recognition elsewhere,
of the adoption status, three possible situations may present themselves to a
court asked to grant an adoption:
1. All the parties concerned-the child, the natural parents, and the foster
parents-are domiciled within the state requested to establish the status. The
overwhelming weight of authority agrees that under these circumstances,
the court clearly has jurisdiction. 6 New York is in accord.7 In the instant
decision, all three parties seem to have been domiciled within Rhode Island
at the time the oral contract was made. But since Rhode Island attaches no
legal significance to an oral contract to adopt, the Federal District Court
sitting in Missouri rightly decided that in an instance where the parties had
failed to comply with the adoption requirements of their local state, a fortiori
no foreign state would recognize the adoption as consummated.
2: The child may be domiciled within the state asked to establish the
status, but the adoptor parent is not.8 Here again, the weight of authority
permits adoption.9 Sociologists and text-writers dissent on the ground that
the courts fail to recognize all the interests affected by adoption, particularly
that of the foster parent whose status should be governed only by his own
state of domicile.10 They maintain that the court is unable to acquaint itself
properly with the qualifications of the adoptor parent, since it is powerless
to summon witnesses and evidence from any jurisdiction other than its own.
They argue, therefore, that both child and parent must be domiciled within
a state before its court may assume jurisdiction. At least twelve states take
this view, and require that the foster parent bd either a legal resident or an
actual resident for at least one year.i' Other commentators are of the opinion
5Newbold, Jurisdictional and Social Aspects of Adoption (1927) 11 MINN. L. REV. 605.
6Ross v. Ross, supra note 2; Anderson v. French, 77 N. H. 509, 93 Atl. 1042 (1915).
"Betz v. Horr, supra note 2.8 it should be noticed that there is little discussion devoted in either the cases or the
text books to the rights of the natural parent under the lex domicilii rule. This is not
the result of inadvertence but primarily because the problem rarely presents itself. The
natural parent of an abandoned child, by his act of abandonment, estops himself from
asserting any further rights with regard to the child. Where the child is not abandoned
but is voluntarily given over to an adopting couple, no question of jurisdictiox as to the
natural parent arises where the court has jurisdiction over the child, since the child's
domicile is that of his parents. A number of states, however, require permission of the
natural parents. See note 17 infra. Of course, if the mother is domiciled elsewhere,
or if the parents are divorced, the court may be called upon to deal with a third domicile.
The general view with regard to such non-resident parties appears to be that notice
to them by publication of the adoption proceedings is sufficient. See note 18 infra.9Van Matre v. Sankey, 148 Ill. 536, 36 N. E. 628 (1893) ; Succession of Caldwell, 114
La. 195, 38 So. 140 (1905) ; Blanchard v. State, 30 N. M. 459, 238 Pac. 1004 (1925) ;
Wolf's Appeal, 10 Sad. 139, 13 Atl. 760 (Pa. 1888). See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICr OF
LAws (1934) § 142, quoted supra note 4.
'
0 Newbold, supra note 5, at 611. Professor Beale is of the opinion that ... jurisdic-
tion to adopt would seem to depend strictly on common domicile of both parties ..
2 BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAwS (1st ed. '1935) 713.
"IAlaska, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Pennsyl-
1941]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
that awarding a decree in these cases would cause little danger either to the
social institutions of the adoptor parent's state or to the welfare of the child.12
Although there is a marked dearth of New York decisions on the point,
New York seems to be of the view that it may create an adoption if the
child is domiciled in New York regardless of the domicile of the adoptor
parent.' 3 The first general adoption enactment in 1873 required that the
foster parent be a resident of the county in which the adoptionwas decreed,'4
but an amendment in 1916 vitiated this requisite by permitting non-resi-
dents to adopt.15 So a New York court has permitted an adoption in New
York by a couple domiciled in Canada of a child whose domicile was in New
York.16 Search, however, reveals no other case in point.
It is submitted that feasibility and reason support the majority rule, despite
its disregard for the domicile of the adoptor. In the matter of adoption, the
child's interest is clearly paramount, and with intelligent legislative safe-
guards to secure that interest, it is difficult to perceive why' a technical lack
of jurisdiction over the adoptor should adversely affect the child. The New
York statute providing for an investigation by the court or some competent
agency or person so as to provide the presiding judge with "bases for deter-
mining the propriety of approving the adoption" is commendably adequate.
The New York requirement of the natural parents' permission"1 prevents
any injustice toward them. This theory leaves out of consideration the in-
terest of the state of the adoptor's domicile in having or not having the
adoptor's status affected by acts done by a foreign state. But our experi-
enced and competent judges may be trusted not to "foist" such children upon
other jurisdictions.' Finally, to require that the'child and the foster parent
have common domiciles would prevent non-residents from adopting local
children, and thereby run counter to a public policy favoring adoption.
3. The foster parent is domiciled within the jurisdiction of the court
asked to grant the adoption, but the child and the natural parents are not-
vania, Texas, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin. 4 VERNIER, AMIMCAN FAMILY LAWS
(1st ed. 1936) 286-292. For amendments see VERXNmI, AmEUCAN FAm,.y LAvs,
(Supp. 1938) 118.
In re Sharon's Estate, 179 Cal. 447, 177 Pac. 283 (1918) ; Knight v. Gallaway, 42
Wash. 413, 85 Pac. 21 (1906).
It should be observed that "residence" is not necessarily synonymous with domicile,
and there is frequently a question under such statutes whether temporary residence will
suffice.
'
2 GooDvicH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) 382.
'
3 See CHEATHAM, THE NEW YoR ANNOTATIONS to the RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT
OF LAWs (1935) § 142.
14N. Y. Laws 1873, c. 830. Ii re Carpenter, 74 Misc. 127, 133 N. Y. Supp. 735 (Co.
Ct. 1911).
1SN. Y. iLaws 1916, c. 453. The present enactment is N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW Art. 7,§ 112.
16-1z re Voluntary Adoption of Minor, 130 Misc. 793, 226 N. Y. Supp. 445 (Surr. Ct.
(1927).
-1N. Y.D L Art. 7, § 111. Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Tennessee,
Delaware and Indiana have similar consent statutes. Consent of the natural parents is
not required under certain conditions defined by statute. Matter of Livingstone, 151
App. Div. 1, 135 N. Y. Supp. 328 (2d Dep't 1912).
'SNewbold, supra note 5, at 614.
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the circumstance presented by the principal case. Here again, the American
decisions permit adoption, overlooking the technical lack of jurisdiction
over the child and natural parent.19 While no New York decisions on the
point have been found, its adoption statute would appear to sanction a
decree in such a case.20
From a practical standpoint, commentators who argue that only the child's
domiciliary state has jurisdiction to change its status2 ' make no provision
for adoptions involving abandoned children, waifs, and orphans-instances
in which adoption is most expedient and frequent. Since minors are power-
less to change their domiciles, strict adherence to the letter of the leax domicilii
rule would render it impossible for non-residents to adopt local orphans or
abandoned children. The minority position would likewise preclude such an
obviously desirable adoption as that in Stearns v. Allen 2 2 where the natural
father was domiciled in Scotland but the child had lived all her life in Massa-
chusetts. Clearly, Massachusetts was fully capable of ministering to the
well-being of the child. Scarcely the same could be said of Scotland. Yet,
the latter was the child's technical domicile though the former was not. Cer-
tainly any child domiciled elsewhere is surrounded with all the protection
given to local children.2
One notable feature of the New York statute is the provision24 for a pro-
bationary period of six months during which the child must reside with the
foster parents-to-be. This enables the court to determine whether the child's
reaction to its new surroundings is favorable, and whether the adoptor has
the resources and talents for the proper rearing of children.
To conclude, however, that a court of forum possesses jurisdiction to effect
the relation of adoption is to resolve only half the problem. No treatment
of adoption can be adequate without a discussion of its recognition by foreign
'
9 The ground upon which such decisions rest is succinctly stated in the leading case
of Stearns v. Allen, 183 Mass. 404, 407, 67 N. E. 349 (1903) : "If the child is actually
dwelling in the state, although his father's domicil is elsewhere, the state may as well
provide for his adoption as to provide for him in other ways. Although the status of
the natural parent in reference to the child is affected by the adoption, the jurisdiction
which gives the right to decree adoption is jurisdiction over the adopted parents and the
child, who are the parties whose status is directly decreed."
Rizo v. Burruel, 23 Ariz. 137, 202 Pac. 234 (1921) ; Woodward's Appeal, 81 Conn.
152, 70 Atl. 453 (1908). See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934), § 142 (b), and
note 4 supra.2 0N. Y. Dom. REL. LAw Art. 7, § 112(1) :- "The foster parents ..... thelfoster child
and all persons whose consent is required . . . must appear . . . before a ... surrogate
of the county where the foster parents . . . resides [sic] or, if the foster parents . . .
does [sic] not reside in this state, before a judge . . . of the county where the foster
child resides."2 1BEALE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 715-716.2 2Supra note 19.2 3 STumBERG, CONFLICT. OF LAWS (lst ed. 1937) 309, note 40: "The place where the
child resides . . . can . . . best pass upon the factors upon which adoption should be
permitted, and that state can also, because of its control of the child, make its findings
effective by consenting or refusing to release it." "
New York approaches maximum, protection by requiring the consent of the child if
he is over fourteen years of age. N. Y. Dom. REL. LAWv Art. 7, § 111.24N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW Art. 7, § 112. Arizona and Maine have recently amended
their statutes to provide for investigation and probationary residence.
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jurisdictions. That issue is clearly presented in the principal case by the
request of the allegedly adopted child that the court recognize an adoption
in Rhode Island in order that she might inherit property located in Missouri.
Whether an adopted child can inherit and what law governs such inheritance
is reserved for a note to appear in a subsequent issue of the CORNELL LAW
QUARTERLY.
Louis- Pollack
Constitutional Law: A survey of recent decisions on the commerce
clause.-Twenty-three years ago the Supreme Court in Hammer v. Dagen-
hart' denied that Congress had power to forbid interstate shipment of goods
produced by child labor and held the Child Labor Act 2 unconstitutional. The
majority of the Court concluded, first, that the production of goods intended
for interstate commerce was not itself interstate commerce; second, that power
to regulate the conditions under which such goods were manufactured must
consequently rest with the states and not Congress ;3 and third, that the power
of Congress to prohibit the shipment of goods in interstate commerce did not
include the power to condition shipment upon submission to federal regula-
tion of activities allied with production.4 "The powerful and now-classic dis-
sent of Mr. justice Holmes '5 espoused the federalist view that the commerce
power of Congress was not limited by the state police power.6 The cases cited
by the four dissenting justices would seem to confer upon Congress ample
power t9 enact this Child Labor Act.7 Subsequent decisions, however, reiter-
1247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529 (1918).
239 STAT. 675 (1917).
3 The majority*further said that Congress did not have the power to prohibit shipment
in interstate commerce of goods ihich were not inherently noxious or harmful to the
public. And in reference to the invasion of the state police power the Court said: "Over
interstate transportation or its incidents the regulatory power of Congress is ample, but
the production of articles intended for interstate commerce is a matter of local regula-
tion.... The grant of power to Congress over the subject of interstate commerce was
to enable it to regulate such commerce, and not to give it authority to control the states
in the exercise of the police power over local trade and manufacture. The grant of
authority over a purely federal matter was not intended to destroy the local power
always existing and carefully reserved to the states in the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution .... The far reaching result of upholding the Act cannot be more plainly
indicated than by pointing out that if Congress can thus regulate matters entrusted to
local authority by prohibition of the movement of commodities in interstate commerce,
all freedom of commerce will be at an end, and the power of the states 'over local matters
may be eliminated and thus one system of government be practically destroyed." 247
U. S. 251, 272, 274, 276.4For the origin and development of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, see
Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions (1929) 77 U. oV PA. L. REv. 879; and Hale, Un-
constitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 321.5Mr. Justice Stone in U. S. v. F. W. Darby Lumber Co., 61 Sup. Ct. 451, 458 (1941).
6In justification of the exercise of federal control over interstate commerce to the
extent that it might even interfere with the police power of the several states, Mr. Justice
Holmes pertinently pointed out that when a state seeks to send its products across the
state line, state control ceases; and instead of meeting with tariff barriers at its state
borders the state is met with United States public policy through the exercise of the
commerce clause shaped with a view to the benefit of the nation as a whole.
7 The power of Congress to prohibit the shipment of goods in interstate commerce had
[Vol. 26
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ate that the regulation of activities which are essentially local in character is a
problem for state legislation, not federal.8
Subsequent to Hammer v. Dagenhart Congress passed a tax statute, which
levied a tax on employers using child labor in producing goods to be shipped
in interstate commerce but exempted those who did not; this was held
unconstitutional in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company (Child Labor Tax
Case)9 as a penalty, riot a tax, to accomplish a result beyond federal power.
During the ensuing period from 1922 to 1936 the Court declared eight federal
statutes unconstitutional as contravening the letter and spirit of the Com-
merce Clause.10 The last of these cases was Carter v. Carter Coal Company"'
been consistently upheld in prior decisions: Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland
Ry., 242 U. S. 311, 37 Sup. Ct. 180 (1917); Weber v. Freed, 239 U. S. 325, 36 Sup.
Ct. 131 (1915) (prize fight films); Hoke v. U. S., 227 U. S. 308. 33 Sup. Ct. 281
(1913) (prostitutes) ; Hipolite Egg Co. v. U. S., 220 U. S. 45, 31 Sup. Ct. 364 (1911)
(impure food) ; Rupert v. U. S., 181 Fed. 87 (C. C. A. 8th 1910) (game unlawfully
killed) ; U. S. v. Popper, 98 Fed. 423 (N. D. Calif. 1899) (obscene literature). Also,
intrastate activities had been regtilated in prior enactments, under varying theories -of
the extent of the federal authority:
(1) Rate cases: Wisconsin Ry. Comm. v. Chi. B. &. Q. Ry., 257 U. S. 563, 42 Sup.
Ct. 232 (1921) ; Shreveport Case, 234 U. S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct. 833 (1913) ; Minnesota Rate
Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729 (1913).
(2) Railway Appliance, Employers Liability, and Railway Labor cases: Second Em-
ployers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 169 (1912); Southern Ry. v. U. S.,
222 U. S. 20, 32 Sup. Ct. 2 (1911) ; B. & 0. Ry. v. I.C.C., 221 U. S. 612, 31 Sup. Ct.
621 (1910).
(3) Anti-Trns Cases: U. S. v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525, 33 Sup. Ct. 141 (1912);
Standard Oil Co. v. U. S., 221 U. S. 1, 31 Sup. Ct. 502 (1910) ; U. S. v. American To-
bacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 31 Sup. Ct. 632 (1910) ; Swift & Co. v. U: S., 196 U. S. 375,
25 Sup. Ct. 276 (1905) ; Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197, 24 Sup. Ct. 436(1903) ; Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S. 211, 20 Sup. Ct. 96 (1899).
Yet it is conceded that prior to Hammer v. Dagenlzart there were several cases which
definitely were in accord insofar as the majority had held that production was a local
activity only subject to state control. Such statements appear in U. S. v. E. C. Knight
Co., 156 U. S. 1, 15 Sup. Ct. 249 (1894) and Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 9 Sup. Ct.
6 (1888). See also cases cited infra note 8.
sChassanoil v. Greenwood, 291 U. S. 584, 54 Sup. Ct. 541 (1934) (occupation of cotton
buying); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm. of Okla., 286 U. S. 210, 52 Sup. Ct.
559 (1932) (production of oil) ; Utah Power and Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165, 52
Sup. Ct. 548 (1932) (production of electricity) ; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery, 260 U. S.
245, 43 Sup. Ct. 83 (1922) (ownership of coal) ; United Mine Workers v. Coronado
Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570 (1921) (coal mining).
The dominant theme running through all these cases was that to hold the activity
a part of inteirstate commere would nationalize all industries and that such a holding
would put an end to our dual form of government.
Shortly after Hammer v. Dagenhart two important cases were decided in which the
commerce clause was held to control admittedly intrastate activities on a "burden on
interstate commerce" theory, and a "flow of commerce" theory. Board of Trade of City
of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1, 43 Sup. Ct. 470 (1922) (rezulating sales of grain on
Chicago Board of Trade) ; Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 42 Sup. Ct. 397 (1921)
(regulating fees and commissions of brokers in stockyards).
9259 U. S. 20, 42 Sup. Ct 449 (1921).
10Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 42 Sup. Ct. 453 (1922), invalidating provisions of the
Future Trading Act which taxed heavily sales of graih "futures" which did not comply
with a complex federal regulation of the grain markets and exempted sales which did
comply. The Court stated that it was an attempt to regulate by a tax an activity over
which Congress had no control. Truslow v. Crooks, 269 U. S. 475, 46 Sup. Ct. 165
(1926) invalidated the subsequent provisions of the Futures Act upon the same reason-
1941]
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invalidating the Guffey Coal Act 2 which fixed coal prices at the mines and
established minimum wages for the miners. The Court found the price and
labor provisions inseparable and the former fell with the latter which was
seen to be a regulation of production and not interstate commerce.13 Here,
interstate commerce had not begun, whereas, in Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States'-4 it had ceased. The intention of the Court in both cases was
to set limits beyond which Congress could not step and to leave the problem
involved with the states.
Since 1936 there has been a reversal of trend which appears to many to
have the effect of a constitutional amendment by judicial interpretation with-
out resort to the customary amendment procedure.15 The turning point came
with N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Company, 6 and companion cases,17
which sustained the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act 8
compelling employers to bargain collectively and forbidding unfair labor
practices. Labor trouble in a manufacturing plant which stood in the middle
of the "flow of commerce" was found to have a sufficient effect upon interstate
commerce because of resulting burdens and obstructions to justify the exten-
ing. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R.R., 295 U. S. 330, 53 Sup. Ct. 758 (1935)
held unconstitutional the Railroad Retirement Act which established a compulsory system
of retirement for railroad employees, the Court saying that in no sense could it be called
a "regulation" of interstate commerce within the meaning of the commerce clause.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295"U. S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837 (1935) in-
validated the National Industrial Recovery Act as an invalid delegation of legislative
power and a violation of the commerce clause. In reference to the latter the Court
stated that the butchering of poultry, purchased in a market wherein chickens from
out-of-state as well as from local sources were sold, was beyond federal regulatory power
since interstate commerce had ceased. United States v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287, 56
Sup. Ct. 223 (1935) held invalid an excessive tax on liquor dealers who operated in
contravention of any state law. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312
(1936) held invalid the Agricultural Adjustment Act which provided for a system of
tax and bonuses applicable to agriculture. The Court said that it was an attempt to
regulate production under guise of a permissive means and therefore beyond federal
power. Rickert Rice Mills v. Fontenat, 297 U. S. 110, 56 Sup. Ct. 374 (1936) held un-
constitutional certain amendments to the A.A.A. which had been invalidated by the
Butler case, supra. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855 (1936).
'lSupra note 10.
1249 STAT. 991 (1935).
'-The Court found that production had no "direct" effect upon interstate commerce
and stated that it was not the magnitude of the effect but the source which gave Congress
the power to regulate. In Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 60
Sup. Ct. 907 (1940) the Court sustained a new coal act which provided for the fixing of
coal prices without attempting to regulate wages and hours. The power of Congress to
fix prices of commodities moving in interstate commerce had already been affirmed in
U. S. v. Rock Royal Co-op, infra note 29.
14Supra note 10.
15 Compare the statement of Chief Justice Hughes in the Carter case [298 U. S. at
3181: "If the people desire to give Congress the power to regulate industries within the
state and the relations of employers and employees in these industries, they are at liberty
to declare their will in the appropriate manner, but it is not for the court to amend the
Constitution by judicial decision."
16301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615 (1936) (Labor dispute in steel mill center of interstate
trade).
'-N.L.R.B. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U. S. 49, 57 Sup. Ct. 642 (1936) ; N.L.R.B.
v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U. S. 58, 57 Sup. Ct. 645 (1936).
1849 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 151 et yeq. (Supp. 1940).
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sion of federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. Problems arising
thereunder, said the Chief Justice, will no longer be regarded in an "intel-
lectual vacuum,"--production, though essentially local when viewed separately,
may become in practice, of national concern. 19 Subsequent decisions demon-
strate that for the Act to apply, it is not necessary that the employer involved
be in the middle of the "flow of commerce" ;20 that, indeed, it is not even
necessary that the product go outside the borders of the state of production
if only it is essential to the interstate activities of others ;21 likewise, that the
volume of goods sent in interstate commerce is not of controlling impor-
tance.22
In no case since N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Company has federal
legislation in this field been held unconstitutional although a number of cases
have involved statutes affecting production. In Mulford v. Smith, the Court,
dismissing the contention, voiced by the dissent, that in actuality it was
production that was being regulated,24 sustained the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act of 193825 which provides for marketing quotas for tobacco farms,
and penalizes sales in excess of such quotas, without regard to whether the
19The Court said that congressional authority to protect interstate commerce from
burdens and obstructions was not limited to transactions which can be deemed to be
an essential part of a "flow" of interstate commerce. Burdens and obstructions may be
due to injurious action springing from other sources. The Court declared [301 U. S.
at 37]: "although activities may be intrastate in character, when viewed separately, if
they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that this control
is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens or obstructions, Con-
gress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control." The Court distinguished
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855 (1935).20Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 303 U. S. 453, 58 Sup. Ct. 656 (1938)
where appellant's packing plant in California packed oranges grown solely in California
and only 37% of its product went out-of-state. The Court said that the labor practices
involved had a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce. An intimation as to
future possible extension of Labor Board activities was voiced when the Court said the
words "direct" and "indirect," "remote" and "substantial" only show a question of degree
and no formal definition is possible; that the process of inclusion and exclusion must
necessarily go on. Seemingly, from this, it could be concluded that the very small manu-
facturer is not covered by the National Labor Relations Act.21Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U. S. 197, 59 Sup. Ct. 206 (1938) wherein
the Labor Act was held applicable to appellant thougf all of its customers were served
wholly within Metropolitan New York. Effect of failure of electrical current on ship-
ping, railroads, tunnels, etc., was sufficient to show that in order to foster and protect
interstate commerce the appellant's employees must be kept satisfied. But see N.L.R.B.
v. Idaho-Maryland Mining Corp., 98 F. (2d) 129 (C. C. C. 9th 1938) where the Labor
Act was held inapplicable to a California gold mine which sold all its gold to the San
Francisco Mint which re-shipped to Denver, the court saying that the labor activities in
the mine had no close or substantial relation to interstate commerce.
22 N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601, 59 Sup. Ct. 668 (1939)' where a small New
Jersey plant which processed clothing for a New York firm and shipped them to New
York was held to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Labor Board. See also N.L.R.B. v.
Crowe Coal Co., 104 F. (2d) 633 (C. C. A. 8th 1939).
23307 U. S. 38, 59 Sup. Ct. 648 (1939).
2 4 1t is of interest to note the conversion of Mr. Justice Roberts who wrote the ma-
jority opinion in this case as well as in U. S. v. Butler, supra note 10. In the principal
case it was stated that since the farmer never knows whether his tobacco will ultimately
go in intrastate or interstate commerce, when he sells his crop to a warehouse, then
regulation, to be effective, may constitutionally apply to all his sales.
2552 STAT. 31, 120, 202, 586, 775 (1938), 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 1281 et seq. (1939).
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ultimate destination of the tobacco sold is interstate or intrastate commerce.
The reasoning of the Court that to tell a farmer how much tobacco he will
be allowed to sell is not telling him how much he may produce is difficult to
justify. Currin v. Wallwe 26 held valid the Tobacco Inspection Act 27 pro-
viding for grading and inspection of tobacco preceding sale at auction. In
both this and the Mulford case the Court applied a generalized "Shreveport
Doctrine" stating that since interstate and intrastate sales are made in the
same market, federal regulation must necessarily extend to both if the Con-
gressional purpose is, as it was here, to regulate the market rather than
individual transactions.
Although the states have been held to have the power to regulate prices
of commodities through their police power 2s and the power of Congress
granted by the Commerce Clause has been referred to as a police power of
the federal government, the question as to the power of Congress to regulate
the price of a commodity moving in interstate commerce had been left open
in the Carter case. This uncertainty was resolved in United States v. Rock
Royal Co-op29 which sustained a federal statute0 regulating minimum prices
to be paid farmers by marketing agencies for milk destined for local or out-
of-state consumption.31 If price regulation is deemed an appropriate means
to attain an end which is constitutional, then the court will not discuss its
motive or propriety. Once more local and interstate sales were found to be
inextricably intermingled.
The tenor of recent prior decisions32 was maintained in United States v.
Weiss- holding a federal statute3 4 applicable to prevent interception of intra-
26306 U. S. 1, 59 Sup. Ct. 379 (1939).
2749 STAT. 731 (1935), 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 511-5111q (1939).
2 8Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505 (1933).
29307 U. S. 533, 59 Sup. Ct. 993 (1939).
3 0 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 50 STAT. 246 (1937), 7 U. S. C. A.
§§ 601 et seq. (1939). This Act also contains a provision permitting federal regulation
of retail milk prices.
3SHere local and foreign milk was drawn in on one large scale plan to protect inter-
state commerce from interferences, burdens and obstructions arising from low prices
to farmers. The regulation of sales for domestic consumption was deemed necessary to
protect sales of milk destined for interstate commerce.3 2During this period that the Supreme Court has consistently upheld federal legislation
a great deal of state social and economic legislation has also been sustained thus allaying
the fears of some that the states were becoming mere satellites. Ry. Comm. of Texas
v. Rowan and Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573, 60 Sup. Ct. 1021 (1940) ; Osborn v. Ozlin,
310 U. S. 53, 60 Sup. Ct. 758 (1940) ; Veix v. 6th Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U. S.
32, 60 Sup. Ct. 792 (1940) ; Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598, 60 Sup. Ct. 726 (139) ;
Clason v. Indiana, 306 U. S. 439, 59 Sup. Ct. 609 (1939) (state license required to trans-
port dead animals into another state) ; Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products,
306 U. S. 346, 59 Sup. Ct. 528 (1939) (Pennsylvania statutd regulating milk prices) ;
Ziffrin v. Reeves, 308 U. S. 132, 60 Sup. Ct. 163 (1939) (Kentucky statute requiring a
license to transport liquor in local or interstate commerce) ; West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578 (1937) (upheld a state minimum wage and max-
imum hour law); South Carolina Hwy. Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S., 177, 58 Sup.
Ct. 510 (1937) (state statute regulating size and width of trucks) ; Keltey v. Washington
ex tel. Foss Co., 302 U. S. 1, 58 Sup. Ct. 87 (1937).
33308 U. S. 321, 60 Sup. Ct. 269 (1939).
3 4Federal Communications Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 1064, 1103 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A.
§ 605 (Supp. 1940).
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state telephone messages by wire-tapping since they were necessarily inter-
mingled with interstate messages. Is the power of Congress now limited to
mere "regulation" of interstate commerce as the Commerce Clause reads?
The most recent New Deal legislation, and perhaps the most important
from a standpoint of national economics, to be upheld, was considered in the
current term in the case of United States v. F. W. Darby Lumber Company.88
In that decision, by a unanimous court, the Fair Labor Standards Act of
193836 (The Wages and Hours Law) was held to be constitutional. The
Act set up a comprehensive scheme for preventing the shipment in interstate
commerce of certain products and commodities produced under labor con-
ditions as respects wages and hours which fall to conform to standards
established by the Act. The statute provides for minimum wages and max-
imum hours and prohibits the employment of child labor.37 In sustaining
the legislation the Court rested its decision primarily upon the cases herein-
before discussed. The dominating theme was that since Congress has the
power to prohibit the shipment of a commodity in interstate commerce, then,
a fortiori it can condition the shipment so that goods produced under sub-
standard labor conditions, with their destructive effect on competition, may
not leave the state of production. Hammer v. Dagenhart was' expressly over-
ruled. The wages and hours provision was upheld on the theory that intra-
state activities which materially affect and burden interstate commerce may
be regulated as an appropriate means to a legitimate end-the exercise of the
granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.88
However much the decision could be called a foregone conclusion in the
light of past cases still its repercussions may be pronounced. It would seem
that the Act by its very wording was not intended to apply to industries
whose products are not sold out of the state; Federal Trade Commission v.
Bunte Brothers,89 setting an analogous problem under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, makes it clear that, at least for the moment, this intention
will be respected. If Congress sees fit to legislate in the future for the pur-
pose of bringing such industries within the Act, however, it is the writer's
opinion that such legislation would be held constitutional. If local producers
are permitted to pay lower wages and employ sub-standard labor, interstate
3561 Sup. Ct. 451, 85 L. ed. 397 (Feb. 3, 1941).
8652 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 201 et seq. (Supp. 1940).
87Defendant was engaged in finishing lumber in Georgia for shipment out of state.
He was indicted for non-compliance with the Act as he had failed to pay the basic min-
imum wage and had worked his employees beyond the maximum number of hours. The
defendant attacked the Act as being unconstitutional under the commerce clause, a
violation of the Tenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and a violation of the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment.88in reference to regulation of intrastate activities the Court cited the Rate Cases,
supra note 7; the cases arising under the Sherman Act, supra note 7; as well as Currin
v. Wallace, supra note 26 and Mulford v. Smith, supra note 23.
In rejection of the contention that the Act was a violation of the Tenth Amendment
the Court said that Amendment states that powers not delegated to Congress are left
with the states, but has always been interpreted to mean that it did not cut down at all
the powers which were delegated; nor does it deprive the federal government authority
to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power which is appropriate and
plainly adapted to the permitted end. Any doubts as to this, added the Court, have been
put to rest by the Sherman Act decisions and the Labor Board cases.
3961 Sup. Ct. 580 (1941).
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producers are placed on a weaker competitive basis in that state market. It
would seem that there is considerable precedent for holding that such intra-
state activities burden and obstruct interstate commerce, and though it is
manifestly a question of degree, a federal statute could constitutionally apply
at least in instances where the burden is heavy and competition keen.40
Donald R. Harter
Constitutional Law: Labor Law: Statute prohibiting picketing by less
than majority of employees as infringement on freedom of speech.-
The Wisconsin "Employment Peace Act"' declares cobperating in engaging
in, promoting or inducing "picketing, boycotting or any other overt act con-
comitant of a strike," unless a majority in a collective bargaining unit of the
employees of an employer have voted to call a strike, to be an unfair labor
practice.2 In Hotel and Restaurant Employees' International Alliance, et al.
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, Plankington House Company et
al., 294 N. W 632 (Wis. 1940) (hereafter referred to as the Plankington
House case), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed an order of the Em-
ployment "Relations Board (made pursuant to the statute) directing the union
to cease and desist from engaging in, promoting or inducing picketing at or
near the premises of Plankington House. The evidence indicated that the
union had not obtained the approval of a majority of the employees of the
Plankington House Company, and that there had been threats, assaults, in-
timidation and violence in the course of the picketing. The court, in affirming
the order, declared the "Employment Peace Act" constitutional and denied
the contention that, in limiting the right to picket in any manner to a majority
of employees, the statute contravenes the guarantees of free speech afforded
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and
Article I-of the Constitution of the State of Wisconsin.3
40See Shreveport Case, mpra note 7. See also U. S. v. Louisiana, 290 U. S. 70, 54
Sup. Ct. 28 (1933) and Wisconsin Ry. Comm. v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry., 257 U. S. 563,
42 Sup. Ct. 232 (1921) where the Court stated that intrastate railroad rates could be
established by the Interstate Commerce Commission in order to foster and protect inter-
state rates. In U. S. v. Rock Royal Co-op, supra note 29, it was settled that Congress
could regulate intrastate milk prices as a means of protecting interstate prices. In many
cases hereinbefore cited and discussed intrastate activities have been regulated by the
federal government through the Commerce Clause. Iri the rate cases the Court relied
on the fact that intrastate and interstate carriage was intermingled to justify federal
control, but in the Rock Royal case there was no such evidence of intermingling. Chief
Justice Hughes in N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., supra note 16, stated that
intrastate activities which have only an indirect effect on interstate commerce must be
kept beyond the pale of federal control if our dual system of government is to be main-
tained. It would seem, therefore, that before a federal wages and hours law could con-
stitutionally apply to an intrastate producer his sales would have to be in such volume
as to directly and substantially affect the local sales of an out-of-state producer. See
N.L.R.B. v. Santa Cruz Packing Co., supra note 20.
'Wis. STAT. (1939) c. 111.2 Wis. STAT. (1939) § 111.06 (2e).
SThe court also discttssed the constitutionality of the statute on the questions of
vagueness of terms, indefiniteness of prohibitions, and the exercise of the police power
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Freedom of speech is one of the most fundamental rights embodied in the
Constitution. That this freedom, protected against encroachment by the
federal government by the First Amendment, 4 is protected against state action
by the Fourteenth Amendment is a well settled proposition.5 It is equally
well settled that this is not an absolute freedom; that both the state and
federal governments may restrict the right under certain special circum-
stances.6 The trend of recent cases, however, has been to guard zealously
the rights of free speech and free press, declaring as unconstitutional restric-
tive laws that were not based on protection of public safety, health, morals
or welfare.
7
The right to picket has had no such clear passage. At first the right to
picket in any manner was denied entirely.8 Later cases and legislation have
universally -recognized the right of "peaceful picketing."9 In some instances,
when the number of pickets was so large as to be an "intimidating force," the
picketing has been enjoined.10 Courts have enjoined all picketing where
of the state. This note, however, is confined to the relation of the statute to the
guarantees of free speech.
4
"Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting . . . or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press ... "
5Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 58 Sup. Ct. 149 (1937); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931) ; Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 51
Sup. Ct. 532 (1931); Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 47 Sup. Ct. 641 (1927);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45, Sup. Ct. 625 (1925).6 Voicing opinions that may hinder the conduct of a war may be restricted. Abrams
v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 40 Sup. Ct. 17 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249
U. S. 211, 39 Sup. Ct. 252 (1919) ; Schenk v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct.
247 (1919) ("clear and present danger"). During peace time, utterances which may
lead to the overthrow of the government may be prohibited. Herndon v. Lowry, 301
U. S. 242, 258, 57 Sup. Ct. 732 (1937) ("rule of reason"); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931) ; Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 51 Sup. Ct.
532 (1931) ; Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 47 Sup. Ct. 641 (1927).' The pro-
hibition of the display of uncomplimentary signs near a foreign embassy was upheld in
Frend v. United States, 100 F. (2d) 691 (App. D. C. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U. S. 640,
59 Sup. Ct. 489 (1938). See Warm, Applied Democracy-The Bill of Rights if; Action,
14 U. oF CiN. L. REv. 53.
7Cantwell et al. v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 Sup. Ct. 900 (1940) ; Schneider v.
State of New Jersey, 308 U. S. 147, 60 Sup. Ct. 146 (1939) ; Hague v. Committee of
Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954 (1939) ; Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666 (1938). Compare the early case of Davis v. Massachu-
setts, 167 U. S. 43, 17 Sup. Ct. 731 (1897). But cf. Minersville School District v.
Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 60 Sup. Ct. 1010 (1940). See also, Warm, supra note 6, at 110.8 State v. Donaldson, 32 N. J. L. 151, 90 Am. Dec. 649 (1867); People v. Wilzig,
4 N. Y. Cr. R. 403 (1886); People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9 (N. Y. 1835); People v.
Melvin, 2 Wheeler Cr. Cas. 262 (N. Y. 1810). See also Nelles, The First American
Labor Case (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 165; Witte, Early American Labor Cases (1926)
35 YALE L. J. 825, 826.
.
9Jones v. E. Van Winkle Gun & Machine Works, 131 Ga. 336, 62 S. E. 236 (1908);
Keuffel and Esser v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 93 N. J. Eq. 429, 431, 116 Atl.
9 (1922) ; Connett v. United Hatters of North America, 76 N. J. Eq. 202, 74 At. 188
(1909) ; La France Co. v. Electrical Workers, 108 Ohio St. 61, 140 N. E. 889 (1923) ;
Kermse v. Adler, 311 Pa. 78, 166 Atl. 566 (1933). And see Norris-LaGuardia Act,
47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 104, 115 (1940 Supp.). There are at least 19
state statutes which prohibit judicial interference with peaceful picketing. See Cooper,
The Fiction of Peaceful Picketing (1936) 35 MicHE. L. REv. 73, note 1.
'OAmerican Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72
(1921) ; Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65 (1917) ;
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violence and intimidation had previously been used ;11 and some courts have
held that picketing where there is no labor dispute is unlawful. 12 One court
held that picketing by a colored organization in an attempt to force an em-
ployer to hire negro help was a racial matter, not subject to the rules ap-
plicable to labor disputes, and, therefore, enjoinable.13 Whether upholding or
denying the right to picket in any case, .the early cases did not discuss the
problem from the standpoint of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech.
One of the very earliest expressions of the belief that the right to picket
is under the protection of the First Amendment was made by Justice Wagner
of the New York Supreme Court:
"The right to picket is founded on constitutional principles .... Nor
is it material whether one or several pickets be maintained. Right or
wrong is not determined by mere numerical considerations. . . . The
right to freedom of speech or freedom of action belongs, not only to the
individuals, but to individuals combined for a lawful purpose."'14
This view was taken by the Supreme Court of the United States in Senn v.
Tile Layers Union.'5 Since that case, this basis for the protection of peaceful
picketing has often been relied upon.16 Several statutes similar to the Wis-
consin act under discussion have been declared unconstitutional on the
ground that the minority employees have as much right as the majority freely
Southern California Iron & Steel Co. v. Amalgamated Association etc., 186 Cal. 604, 200
Pac. 1 (1921); Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Federation of Steel Workers, 114
N. J. Eq. 307, 168 Atl. 799 (1933) ; Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E.
(2d) 910 (1937).
IlMilk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.,
9 U. S. L. WExzr 4185 (U. S. 1941) ; Busch Jewelry Co., et al. v. United Retail Em-
ployees' Union, et al., 168 Misc. 224, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 575 (1938), aff'd, 281 N. Y. 150,
22 N. E. (2d) 320 (1939), noted (1939) 24 CORNELL L. Q. 128; Exchange Bakery &
Restaurant, Inc. v. Rivkin, et al., 245 N. Y. 260, 269, 157 N. E. 130 (1927) ; Flashner
v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters etc., 37 Pa. D. & C. 337 (1939).
12Keith Theatre v. Vachon, 134 Me. 392, 187 Atl. 692 (1936) ; Feller v. Local 144
International L. G. W. Union, 121 N. J. Eq. 452, 191 Atl. 111 (1937); Brown & Son
v. Mine Workers, 25 Ohio N. P. (N. s.) 485 (1925). Contra: United Chain Theatres,
Inc. v. Philadelphia Moving Picture Operators Union, 50 F. (2d) 189 (E. D. Pa. 1931);
Steffes v. Motion Picture Operators Union, 136 Minn. 200, 161 N. W. 524 (1917) ; Empire
Theatre Co. v. Cloke, 53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. 107 (1917) ; Exchange Bakery & Res-
taurant, Inc. v. Rivkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927); Blumauer v. Portland
Moving Picture Machine Operators Prot. Union, 141 Ore. 399, 17 P. (2d) 1115 (1933).
'
3 Green, et al. v. Samuelson, et al., 168 Md. 421, 178 Atl. 109 (1935).
14Segenfeld, et al. v. Friedman, et al., 193 N. Y. Supp. 128, 130, 117 Misc. 731 (Sup.
Ct. 1922).
-5301 U. S. 468, 478, 57 Sup. Ct. 857 (1937). The Court said: "Members of a union
might, without special authorization by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute
for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the federal constitution." (Italics supplied.)
That the acts of picketing, carrying banners and distribution of circulars are "speech"
or "press," see Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 532 (1931) (the
display of a red flag discussed as a free speech problem), and Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666 (1938), where the Court said: "The press in its historic
connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of informa-
tion and opinion." 303 U. S. 444, 452, 58 Sup. Ct. 666 (1938). See- also Schneider v.
New Jersey, 308 U. S. 147, 60 Sup. Ct. 146 (1939).
16Ex parte Lyons, 27 Cal. App. (2d) 293, 81 P. (2d) 190 (1938). See note 17 infra.
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to place before the public their views concerning working conditions. The
Supreme Court so held in the leading cases of Thornhill v. Alabama and
Carlson v. California .1 7 The Plankington case, however, distinguishes the
Wisconsin statute on the grounds that (1) it is not a criminal statute, and
(2) the court's interpretation of the sweeping words prohibiting all picket-
ing by the minority, limits its application to picketing which involves intimida-
tion and violence as found in the evidence of the case at bar.
In providing for restraining orders by the Board enforceable by the
courts,18 the Wisconsin statute, it would seem, is just as effective a restric-
tion on peaceful picketing as a criminal statute. Disobeying the court's re-
straining order would make a picket subject to fine or imprisonment for con-
tempt of court. That freedom of speech in these cases is to be protected
from infringement by injunction as well as from prohibitory statutes was
recognized in the earliest cases.' 9
The construction of a statute by the highest court of a state is binding upon
the Supreme Court of the United States and if viewed in conjunction with
that construction the statute is constitutional, the Supreme Court will uphold
its validity.20 But in the realm of "fundamental liberties," the constitutional
validity of a statute has been tested by what may be done under it, rather
'than by what has been done.21 Judging the Wisconsin statute on its face,
its validity is necessarily controlled by the decision in Thornhill v. Alabama.
On the other hand, accepting the proposition that the meaning of the words
in the statute is fixed by the court's decision 22 in the Plankington case, since
17Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736 (1940) ; Carlson v. California,
310 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 746 (1940) ; People v. Gidaly, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 758, 93 P.(2d) 660 (1939); City of Reno v. Second Judicial District Court, 59 Nev. 416, 95 P.
(2d) 994 (1939) ; American Federation of Labor v. Bain, 106 P. (2d) 544 (Ore. 1940).
The statutes and ordinances in all of the cases cited made all picketing, unless sanctioned
by a majority of the employees of the place picketed, unlawful and punishable by fine
or imprisonment. Thornhill v. Alabama is the leading case. Mr. Justice Murphy
speaking for the court therein said: 'In the circumstances of our times the dissemination
of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that
area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the constitution." 310 U. S. 88, 102 (1940).
None of the cases impair the state's right to prohibit intimidation, coercion, violence or
any act leading to a breachl of the peace. For an early state case which held a similar
prohibitory statute constitutional, see Thomas et al. v. City of Indianapolis, 195 Ind. 440,
145 N. E. 550 (1924).
18Wis. STAT. (1939) § 111.07 (7).
19 Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U. S. 468, 57 Sup. Ct. 857 (1937) ; Ex parte Lyons,
27 Cal. App. (2d) 293, 81 P. (2d) 190 (1938) ; Segenfeld, et al. v. Friedman, et at.,
193 N. Y. Supp. 128, 117 Misc. 131 (Sup. Ct. 1922).2 0 Morehead v. N. Y. ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U. S. 587, 609, 56 Sup. Ct. 918 (1936);
Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 53 Sup. Ct. 181 (1932) ; Utah Power and Light
Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165, 186, 52 Sup. Ct. 548 (1931); Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R.
Commission, 271 U. S. 583, 592, 46 Sup. Ct. 605 (1926); Arizona Employers" Liability
Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 430, 39 Sup. Ct. 553 (1919) ; Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania,
232 U. S. 531, 544-545, 546, 34 Sup. Ct. 359 (1914).2 1 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666 (1938). Both Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 96, 60 Sup. Ct. 736 (1940), and Carlson v. California, 310
U. S. 106, 111, 60 Sup. Ct. 746 (1940) say that the statute must be judged on its face.
In both those cases, however, the evidence did not indicate anything but strictly peaceful
picketing. If a conviction was to be had at all, the court would have had to uphold the
sweeping provisions of the statutes in question.2 2Morehead v. N. Y. ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U. S. 587, 609, 56 Sup. Ct. 918 (1936):
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this decision limits the act's applicability to similar facts (i.e., when violence
and intimidation are involved), it may well be sustained. Since violence and
intimidation are expressly prohibited by another section of the Wisconsin
"Employment Peace Act,"' 23 the provision considered in the instant case
seems to become mere repetition.
Since the instant case is at present controlled by Thornhill v. Alabama, the
basis of that decision should be noted. It is well settled that the Constitution
does not save the citizen from the consequences of wrongful speech (e.g.,
sedition, defamation, unfair competition, inducing breach of contract, etc.).
It may be argued that picketing by a minority which injures the business of
an employer is a similar wrong the consequences of which are not under the
protection of the constitutional guarantee of free speech. The great weight
of modern authority, however, holds that there is a legal right to picket aia
that the injuries occasioned thereby are damnum absque injuria.24  The
Thornhill case rules that the fact that only a minority of employees are on
strike is no basis for declaring that right lost. The principle was succinctly
stated in New York as early as 1927:
"The purpose of a labor union to improve the conditions under which
its members do their work; to increase their wages; to assist them in
other ways may justify what would otherwise be a wrong .... Picketing
without a strike is no more unlawful than a strike without picketing.
Both are based on a lawful purpose. Resulting injury is incidental and
must be endured."'2 5
If this social policy changes, the Supreme Court may, at a future date, reverse
itself and decide that minority peaceful picketing (or, all peaceful picketing)
is a wrong not within the protection of the free speech amendment. 26 The
Wagner Labor Relations Act seems to insist on the right of the majority
of employees.2 7 In one sense it might be said that statutes prohibiting minor-
ity picketing supplement the policy of the act by protecting the majority
employees as well as the employer. The Supreme Court, however, feels that
in prohibiting all picketing by a minority these acts go too far. Furthermore,
the Wagner Act does not prevent the employer from dealing with the minority
too, whereas the Norris-LaGuardia Act28 protects both stranger and minority
"... So this New York Act as construed by her court of last resort, must here be
taken to express the intention and purpose of her lawmakers. Green v. Neals Lessee,
6 Pet. 291, 295-298."23Wis. STAT. (1939) § 111.06 (2f).24Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 103, 60 Sup. Ct. 736 (1940); Music Hall
Theatre v. Moving Picture Machine Operators, 249 Ky. 639, 642, 61 S. W. (2d) 283
(1933); Beck v. Railway Teamsters Prot. Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13 (1898) ;
Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rivkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 263, 157 N. E. 130 (1927).
See cases cited supra note 9.25Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rivkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 263, 157 N. E. 130
(1927).2 6The state cases which held.picketing where there was no labor dispute enjoinable
did so on the ground that such picketing was not based on a legal right. None of these
cases have been appealed to the Supreme Court. It would seem that under the decision
in Thornhill v. Alabama they would be reversed if appealed. This was so held in A. F.
of L. v. Swing, 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4192 (U. S. 1941). See cases cited supra note 1Z.
2749 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 151 et seq. (1940 Supp).
2847 SyAT. 73 (1932), 29 U. S.C. A. § 113 (a) (1940 Supp.).
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picketing. The Thornhill case follows the policy expressed by the latter act.
It might be argued that the limitation on picketing discussed herein does
not unreasonably invade the right to free speech because it leaves the minority
union free in other ways to express its views and to influence the public, the
majority and the employer. Since the protesting union is a minority it should
not be given complete rights; hence, retaining its privilege to speak in other
ways while being prohibited from picketing is a fair regulation. What better
answer to this than the statement in National Labor Relations Board v. Ford
Motor Company: "The right to form opinion is of little value if such opinion
may not be expressed, and the right to express it is of little value if it may
not be communicated to those immediately concerned." 29 This statement
arose out of a problem the converse of the one under discussion. The National
Labor Relations Board had ordered Ford to cease distributing to employees
pamphlets and an almanac in which he expressed his views on labor and
asserted the foolhardiness of joining a union. The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that such an order deprived Ford of his constitutional right
to free speech. This seems entirely consistent with Thornhill v. Alabama
which was cited in the opinion.30
It has been suggested that the purpose of these anti-minority picketing
statutes, which have been declared unconstitutional, might be achieved by
making it unlawful for the employer to do any of the things which might
be the object of minority or stranger picketing, (e.g., the legislature might
make it unlawful for an employer to bargain with less than a majority of
his employees). This would put the unionized minority in the unlawful
position of attempting to coerce the employer into doing an unlawful act,
3
'
and thus put them outside the protection of the First Amendment. Even if
sound in theory, a court might regard it as a mere subterfuge. The present
anti-picketing statutes conflict with the guarantee of free speech because the
minority pickets are committing no wrong. The problem involves two con-
flicting social theories. Upholding picketing by minority groups leaves the
employer subject to the onus of continuous picketing. On the other hand,
every union has an interest in organizing competing open shops throughout
its industry if it is to protect itself from sub-union standard competition.
Jack L. Ratzkin
Corporations: ,Legality of a corporation organized to transmit money
to be used in pari-mutuel be tting.-The first litigation concerning the
recent New York Pari-Mutuel Revenue Law' posed a knotty question for
the court in Stewart et al. v. Department of State of NeA York et al., 174
Misc. 902, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 164 (Sup. Ct. 1940).2 The petitioners desired to
29114 F. (2d) 905 (C. C. A. 6th 1940).
3O0See also Midland Steel Products Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 113 F.
(2d) 800, 804 (C. C. A. 6th 1940).3
'See note (1940) Wis. L. Ray. 272, at 285, note 64q
'N. Y. Laws 1940, c. 254; N. Y. UNcoNsoL. LAws §§ 1939 et seq.2Aff'd w. o. op., 260 App. Div. 979, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 2Z6 (3d Dep't 1940).
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form a corporation to be known as the Pari-Mutuel Messenger Service. They
submitted to the Secretary of State a certificate of incorporation, stating the
purpose of the proposed corporation was to receive money from persons
not in attendance at race tracks, transmit the money to the tracks, place
the bets according to the bettors' directions, collect any winnings, and
return them to the bettors. The corporation was not to accept or make
any bets itself; its sole purpose was to act as transmitting and collecting
agent for those desirous of betting, and to charge a fee not dependent on
whether the bettors won or lost. The Secretary refused to file the certifi-
cate, asserting that this was not a lawful purpose within the meaning of the
Stock Corporation Law.3 In a proceeding brought to compel the filing, the
Supreme Court upheld the Secretary's refusal.
The chief problem before the court, of course, was one of statutory
construction. The New York Constitution legalizes such "pari-mutuel betting
on horse races as may be prescribed by the legislature." 4 The court reasoned
that in view of the wording of the Constitution and of the general consti-
tutional prohibition against gambling,5 no method of betting not prescribed
by the legislature could be legal. The act in which the legislature has pre-
scribed a system of betting provides that such betting "shall only be con-
ducted within the grounds or enclosure of a race track." The services of
the proposed corporation involve transmitting money from persons outside
the grounds.7  Is this a violation of the statute? On this point the statute
is silent. It does not denote what transactions are included within the
scope of the word "betting." Specifically, it does not indicate whether
"betting" refers merely to the using of the pari-mutuel betting machinery
which is provided for the patrons of the track, that is, refers to the actual
purchase of a pari-mutuel ticket and the collection of any winnings, or covers
all the transactions which eventually result in the making of a bet and the
loss or gain of money.
With the question left unanswered because of the limitations of legislative
foresight, one must turn for aid to the decisions. One finds that ". . . a bet
or wager is ordinarily an agreement between two or more, that a sum of
money, in contributing which all agreeing take part, shall become the property
of one of them on the happening in the future of an event at present un-
certain. . . .Each party to the bet gets a chance of gain from the others
and takes a risk of loss of his own to them. One or the other thing must
necessarily occur."8  If this be accepted as the definition of betting, then it
3N. Y. STocK CoRp. LAW § 5: "Three or more persons may become a stock corpora-
tion for any lawful business purpose or purposes. .. "4N. Y. CONST. Art. I, § 9, as amended effective January 1, 1940.
5N. Y. CoNSr. Art I, § 9, permits pari-mutuel betting as an exception to the general
prohibition of gambling: "[N]o lottery or the sale of lottery tickets, pool-selling, book-
making, or any other kind of gambling, except pari-mutuel betting on horse races as
may be prescribed by the legislature and from which the state shall derive a reasonable
revenue for the support of the government, shall hereafter be authorized or allowed
within this state."6 N. Y. PARI-MUTTUEL REVENUE LAW § 1939.1.7The corporation, of course, would also handle money for persons inside the enclosure
of the track.
SPeople v. Fallon, 4 App. Div. 88, 39 N. Y. Supp. 865 (1st Dep't 1896); accord,
Harris v. White, 81 N. Y. 532 (1880).
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would seem that all the actual betting which might result from the proposed
corporation's activities would take place within the enclosure of the track;
there the agreement would be entered into; there the winnings would be paid
off or the losses sustained. Such a definition would debar calling the corpora-
tion a bettor, since the corporation would not be a party to any agreement
nor would it stand to win or lose anything-essential parts of all wagers.
But notice that the statute declares that all betting "shall only be conducted"
within the enclosure of the track.9 Even though the corporation might
not be a party to the betting, the fact remains that the person for whom
the corporation is rendering the services would be a party and would be
outside the enclosure. The word "only" may be used here in a restrictive
sense, with the possible meaning that betting must be transacted wholly
within the grounds of the track; and the word "conducted" might then
be so interpreted as to expand the narrow common law definition of betting
to include the transmittal of money to the track for the purposes of betting.
The trial court so construed these two words, holding the services which
the corporation proposed to render to be an integral part of the "conduct"
of a bet and therefore illegal because not taking place within the enclosure
of the track. The Pari-Mutuel Revenue Law, however, does not require
that bets be placed in person. The only requirement is that bets be made
at the track.10 Statutes regulating pari-mutuel betting in other jurisdic-
tions specify that the bettors must place their bets in person. The omission
of such a provision in the New York statute is significant. If the legislature
intended that no bettor should place a bet through an agent, why did it
not say so? Legislative silence here might be taken to imply legislative
permission.' 2 And in addition to the general definition of a bet which is
given above, it is important to remember that a wager is governed by
principles of contract law.' 3 A contract is made at the place where it is
accepted.14 It might be argued, therefore, that the corporation would not
be involved in "conducting" a bet insofar as its activities outside the track
are concerned; the actual betting contract would be entered into only within
the enclosure of the track where the' pari-mutuel ticket is purchased.
Segregating in this fashion the various transactions which lead up to
a bet would not involve any tugging and pulling at the meaning of the
statute, for the stated purpose of the statute is to insure that all betting
be done through the facilities at the track-vending machines, adding ma-
chines, mutuel indicators, accounting systems-over which the state has
9N. Y. PARI-MUTUEL REVENUE LAW § 1939.1.10N. Y. PAIM-MUTUEL R.EVENUE LAW §§ 1939.1, 1939.4.
"IN. J. STAr. ANN. (Supp. 1940) tit. 5, § 5:5-73; Betting and Lotteries Act, 1934,
24 & 25 GEO. V, c. 58.
12The courts frequently interpret statutes in this manner. Matter of Thomas, 216
N. Y. 426, 110 N. E. 762 (1915); Jensen v. Southern Pac. Co., 215 N. Y. 514, 109
N. E. 600 (1915).13Dowell v. Pumphrey, 197 Ky. 59, 246 S. W. 157 (1922) ; Wilkie v. Weller, 22 Mich.
664, 193 N. W. 235 (1923) ; 6 WILLISTON, CoNmRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson
1937) §§ 1665, 1665A.
14Dudley A. Tying & Co. v. Converse, 180 Mich. 195, 146 N. W. 629 (1914); Ohl
v. Standard Steel Section, Inc., 179 App. Div. 637, 167 N. Y. Supp. 184 (1st Dep't
1917) ; Cowan v. O'Connor, 20 Q. B. D. 640 (188) ; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev.
ed. Williston and Thompson 1936) § 97.
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supervision and from which it can obtain revenue. 15 The corporation would
not only be using these facilities but would also be making them available
to many people who could not otherwise do any legal betting and to those
who might otherwise resort to illegal "horse rooms."
The Pari-Mutuel Revenue Law, moreover, is not clear on another im-
portant point. The section repealing prior legislation makes pari-mutuel
betting lawful ".... if conducted in a manner and subject to the conditions
and supervision provided by this act, notwithstanding the provisions of any
other law, general, special or local, prohibiting or restricting lotteries, pool
selling or bookmaking, or any other kind of gambling. . . ."" The trial
court construed this as rendering inapplicable any other laws only insofar
as they conflict with the provisions of the act. Reasoning that since the
act regulated only betting within the enclosure of a race track it was
not repugnant to any statute which condemned transactions outside the
enclosure, the court held Section 986 of the Penal Law to be applicable.
This Section makes it unlawful to ". . . forward in any manner whatsoever
any money, thing or consideration of value . . . for the purpose of being
bet or wagered by or for any other person," or to act as ". . . custodian or
depositary for gain, hire or reward, of any money, property or thing of
value" which is the subject of a bet or wager.17  If Section 986 has not
been repealed, then there is no need to draw a distinction between the con-
duct of a bet and the transmission of money as an agent for bettors in order
to show that the latter is not prohibited by the Pari-Mutuel Revenue Law,
since this Section declares to be unlawful the very acts which the corporation
proposes to perform. But the repealing section of the Pari-Mutuel Revenue
Law is not clear. It could easily be interpreted to be a general repeal of
all legislation on the subject of pari-mutuel betting, including Section 986
of the Penal Law. To foster statutory uniformity and consistency, the
courts usually hold that a statute covering the whole of any activity
repeals all prior legislation dealing with the same subject matter.18 The
Pari-Mutuel Revenue Law and Section 986 both deal with betting on horse
racing; since the former is all-inclusive, covering the whole activity of
pari-mutuel betting, it might be regarded as superseding Section 986, which
deals with only one phase of betting. Further, the Court of Appeals has held
that the purpose of Section 986 is to abolish unlawful gambling by sup-
pressing its accessories. 19 Since pari-mutuel betting has now been made
lawful, there would seem to be no reason for hampering such betting by
resort to the prohibitions of the Penal Law.
Further confusion as to the meaning of the Pari-Mutuel Revenue Law
5 N. Y. PA~IM-MUTuE REVENuE LAw § 1939.1: ". . . (It is] the ipurpose of this act
to derive from such betting as herein authorized a reasonable revenue for the support
of government and to promote agriculture generally and the improvement of breeding
of horses particularly in the state."
'6N. Y. PAmI-MuTuEL REvENuE LAW § 1939.1.17N. Y. PENAL LAw Art. 88, § 986.
'
8Peterson v. Martino, 210 N. Y. 412, 104 N. E. 916 (1914) ; Pratt Institute v. City
of New York, 183 N. Y. 151, 75 N. E. 1119 (1905) ; Lyddy v. Long Island City, 104
N. Y. 218, 10 N. E. 155 (1887) ; Gerry v. Volger, 252 App. Div. 217, 298 N. Y. Supp.
433 (4th Dep't 1937).
'
9 People ex rel. Lichtenstein v. Langan, 196 N. Y. 260, 89 N. E. 921 (1909).
[Vol. 26
NOTES AND COMMENTS
arises when one compares the section regulating harness horse racing20
with the section regulating thoroughbred and steeple chase racing.21 The
general provision for repeal of prior legislation is incorporated into both
sections, but in addition the section regulating harness horse racing contains
a provision specifically repealing Section 986 of the Penal Law.22 Why was
this specific provision omitted from the section regulating other types of
racing? The court did not consider this question. It is possible that the
legislature thought that the general repealing section was sufficiently broad
to repeal all prior legislation, including Section 986, and that it was not
necessary to repeat this in both sections of the act. But it is also possible
that the legislature omitted this provision because it intended Section 986
to remain applicable to the first section. What weakens this conclusion,
however, is that this would produce the anomalous result of permitting the
transmission of money for betting on harness horse racing but not on
thoroughbred or steeple chase horse racing.
In view of the indefinite language of the Pari-Mutuel Revenue Law
with regard to its scope and meaning, of the apparent conflict between the
act and prior legislation, and of the apparent internal contradictions within
the act itself, it seems desirable that the Court of Appeals should make some
pronouncement on the points at issue in the principal case.*
Rex Rowland
Criminal Law: Perjury: Degrees of perjury not mutually exclusive.-
In the case of People v. Samuels, 284 N. Y. 410, 31 N. E. (2d) 753 (1940),
the information specifically accused defendant of perjury in the second
degree, a misdemeanor, although the allegations of facts were sufficient to
show the commission of the crime of perjury in the first degree, a felony.
The case was tried in the Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York
which has jurisdiction over misdemeanors. Held: the Court of Special Ses-
sions had jurisdiction over the case since the degrees of perjury are not
mutually exclusive and the People had the power to elect to try the defendant
for a misdemeanor regardless of the gravity of his offense.1
The question of whether or not the degrees of perjury are mutually
exclusive can arise in the following situations: (1) testing the jurisdiction
of a lower court as in the above Samuels case; (2) the duty of a committing
magistrate to hold the accused for indictment by a grand jury or to send
20N. Y. PAEI-MuT U REENUE LAw Art. II, §§ 1939.35-1939.55.21N. Y. PARr-MUTuEL REVENUE LAW Art. I, §§ 1939-1939.22.22N. Y. Pmu-MurauE. Rm vuE LAW, § 1939.54.
*Just prior to the publication of this note, the writer has learned that the Court of
Appeals has denied the motion for leave to appeal. The writer has also learned, how-
ever, that Senator James J. Crawford has introduced a bill into the legislature to
legalize the licensing of 150 agents throughout the State, with authority to accept
bets to be made through the Pari-Mutuel Machines at the various tracks.
lConviction of the defendant had been reversed in 259 App. Div. 167, 18 N. Y. S.(2d) 532 (2d Dep't 1940), on the ground that the Court of Special Sessions was with-
out jurisdiction over the subject matter since the degrees as defined were mutually
exclusive. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the judgment of the Appellate
Division on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that defendant had wilfully and knowingly given false testimony;
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him to trial for only a misdemeanor; (3) the court's charge to the jury
distinguishing between the two degrees and stating the distinguishing test
of materiality as a question of fact or law; and (4) the power of the jury
to bring in a verdict of second degree perjury when the accused has been
indicted for the crime in the first degree and the issue of materiality is
in the case.
In New York, prior to 1935, perjury consisted of swearing falsely to a
material matter; the latter issue being commonly said to be one of law.2
Acting upon the recommendations of the New York State Law Revision
Commission, the New York Legislature, in 1935, deleted materiality from
the definition of perjury and divided the crime into two degrees, materiality
being necessary to perjury in the first degree and not to perjury in the
second degree.8 Perjury in the second degree was changed from a felony
to a misdemeanor by the amendment of Section 1633 of the Penal Law
in 19364 These changes were made because of the belief that materiality
as defined by ambiguous interpretations and the severe penalty imposed
were serious impediments to the effective prosecutions of perjury.
In People v. Luckman,5 the court charged the jury that if they should
find that the accused's testimony was not material, they might find him
guilty of perjury in the second degree. Defendant's counsel, however,
objected to this charge and at his request and with the prosecution's
consent, the court ruled that the matter involved was material and the de-
fendant must be found guilty of first degree perjury or acquitted. This
charge indicated that the degrees as defined were mutually exclusive and
that materiality was a question of law. In effect, the decision was that on
a finding of facts which, as a matter of law, would support a conviction of
first degree perjury, the jury had no power to convict of the lesser offense.
This resulted in forcing a jury to choose between first degree perjury or
acquittal. To obviate this difficulty the Law Revision Commission, in 1939,
recommended that second degree perjury should be redefined to include false
statementg as to material as well as to immaterial matters, and that a new
section be added to the Penal Law providing that upon an indictment for
perjury in the first degree as to a material matter, the jury might find
the defendant guilty of perjury in the second degree. 6  These recommenda-
tions, however, were not acted upon.
The Samuels case, in affirming the jurisdiction of the Court of Special
Sessions, held that the two degrees of perjury were not mutually exclusive
2People ex rel. Hegeman v. Corrigan, 195 N. Y. 1, 87 N. E. 792 (1909).
3N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 632; N. Y. PENAL LAW §§ 1620, 1620-a, 1620-b. While the
Commission felt that on a trial of an indictment for first degree perjury the jury
should be able to convict for second degree, they believed that the general provisions
of Section 444 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were entirely adequate for such
purpose. NEw YORK STATr LAW REVIsION CommissIoN REPORT, LEG. Doc. (1935)
No. 60 (F), p. 4. This section provides: "Upon indictment for offense consisting of
different degrees, jury may convict of any degree, or of any attempt to commit the
offense. Upon an indictment for a crime consisting of different degrees, the jury
may find the defendant not guilty of the degree charged in the indictment, and guilty
of any degree inferior thereof, or of an attempt to commit the crime.....4N. Y. Laws 1936, c. 93.
5164 Misc. 230, 297 N. Y. Supp. 616 (Sup. Ct. 1937).6 NEw YORK STATE LAw REVISION CommIssIoN REPORT, LEG. Doc. (1939) No. 65 (G),
p. 9.
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insofar as that issue was involved in determining the power of a court
for the trial of a misdemeanor to try the case when materiality was con-
cededly involved. But the question as to whether the issue itself is one of
law or of fact-the determinant of the charge of the court and the power
of the jury over the verdict-is still unanswered.7 In the Samuels case the
court stated: "The degrees of the crime are not mutually exclusive.... By
the amendments of 1935 and 1936 the crime of perjury became similar to
other crimes with varying degrees, and, like such crimes, subject to the
provisions of Section 444 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."8  This part"
of the opinion, however, is dictum, but does suggest that the choice between
the two degrees, upon proof of perjury as to a matter which is material as
a matter of law in the sense that a conviction of first degree perjury would
be proper, rests with the jury. To urge, however, that materiality is only
a question of law may present a logical inconsistency in at least one situation:
i.e., where the court has charged that the testimony was material but the
jury under the above suggested power of choice renders a verdict of second
degree perjury. Might it not be that the jury was passing on the question
of materiality even though the court had excluded the question from its
determination? This difficulty, however, is largely academic and is, of
course, involved in every case where the court is charging the law but the
jury is given power to render a verdict in one of several degrees of a crime.
Penal statutes should not be phrased in ambiguous terms nor left un-
settled necessitating future interpretation by litigation. Since the dictum of
the Samuels case is embodied within the 1939 recommendations of the Law
Revision Commission, it is suggested that the legislature should now recon-
sider the bill then proposed. The enactment of the statute would operate
as a restatement of the decision and an application of the premises of the
court to the aforementioned problems.
The majority of the other States still retain the old definition of perjury
which includes the requirement of materiality, with the rather traditional
classification of punishment depending upon the type of case--capital, felonies,
or misdemeanors-in which the perjury was committed.9  Utah, however,
7The Law Revision Commission states that to make materiality a question for
jury determination would be unwise, "(1) because as a matter of practice it has quite
uniformly been determined by the court, and (2) because the court is better suited
to pass upon that question on the evidence of written records than is the jury." NEw
YoRK STATE LAW REvisioN CommIssioN REPORT, LEG. Doc. (1939) No. 65 (G), p. 8.
In an earlier case, People v. Redmond, 179 App. Div. 127, 165 N. Y. Supp. 821 (2d
Dep't 1917), the judge suggested that affirmative determination of materiality was
a question of fact for the jury, but no cases appear to have followed such suggestion.
8284 N. Y. 410, 414. In the dissenting opinion Justice Conway stated that in People
v. Hirsh, 283 N. Y. 638 (1940), the court had held that the degrees of perjury were
not mutually exclusive but that the crime was now similar to other crimes divided
into degrees and Section 444 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was applicable. In
the majority opinion the Hirsh case was cited to sustain the contention that the People
had the power to elect to try the defendant for a misdemeanor regardless of the
gravity of his offense. An examination of the opinion of the Hirsh case and also the
preceding opinion in the Appellate Division, 258 App. Div. 947 (1st Dep't 1940),
however, offers no help since they are merely memorandum opinions and neither dis-
closes how the case arose nor the issues involved.
9 ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) c. 205, § 5159 et seq. ; IowA CODE (1939) c. 588,§ 13165; KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1935) art. 7, §§ 21-701, 702; Miss. CODE ANN.
(1930) § 1082, 1083; Mo. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1932) c. 30, art. 2, §§ 879, 881;
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in a forward step in 1937, enacted perjury sections substantially identical
with those of the New York Penal Law.10 Apparently no cases similar to
the Samuels case have been decided under these new sections in Utah, and
it will therefore be interesting to see in what manner Utah will dispose
of the questions raised in the 1939 Law Revision Commission proposals.
Edward R. Moran
Evidence: Privileged communications between physician, and patient in
non-judicial proceedings.-The City Council of New York desired to
investigate charges of unnecessary deaths in the treatment of patients at
Lincoln Hospital, a city-owned institution. The committee appointed to
investigate issued subpoenas duces tecum to those in charge of the hospital,
ordering them to produce certain records. They refused to produce any
records that might disclose information relating to the diagnosis and treat-
ment of patients, claiming that these were communications which were privi-
leged by Sections 352 and 354 of the Civil Practice Act. Section 352 for-
bids a physician who is called as a witness to reveal any information acquired
while attending a patient.' This section has been held to embrace not only
the oral testimony of physicians but also hospital records and other docu-
mentary data.2 Section 354 states that the privilege conferred by Section
352 shall be protected in "any examination of a person as a witness. .... 3
The only question was whether Section 354 includes within its protective
scope not only proceedings in.court but also proceedings before a legislative
committee whose avowed purpose is to ferret out abuses. In Matter of City
Council of the City of New York v. Goldwater, 284 N. Y. 296, 31 N. E.(2d) 31 (1940),4 the Court of Appeals held that the statutes applied to in-
vestigations by any inquisitorial body vested with the subpoena power, and
that consequently the committee could not compel the production of the
records.
OKL STAT. ANN. (Lawyer's Co-op., 1937) tit. 21, §§ 491, 499; OR. CODE ANN.(1930) §§ 14-401, 402; TEx. ANN. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1925) tit. 8, c. 1, art. 302,
308, 309.1 0 UTAn REV. STA2-. ANN. (Supp. 1939) tit. 103, c. 43, §§ 1, 8, 9, 14.
'The text of the pertinent part of Section 352 is: "A person duly authorized to prac-
tice physic or surgery, or a professional or registered nurse, shall not be allowed to
disclose any information which he a~quired in attending a patient in a professional
capacity."2Rarogiewicz v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 242 N. Y. 590, 152 N. E. 440(1926); Lorde v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 252 App. Div. 646, 300 N. Y. Supp. 721(1st Dep't 1937) ; Palmer v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 150 Misc. 669, 270 N. Y.
Supp. 10 (Mun. Ct. N. Y. 1934). See Hale, Hospital Records as Evidence (1941) 14
So. CALIF. L. R.Ev. 99.3The text of the pertinent part of Section 354 is: "[Section 352 applies to] any ex-
amination of a person as a witness unless the provisions thereof are expressly waived
upon the trial or examination by the . . . patient...."4Rev'g 259 App. Div. 883, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 717 (1st Dep't 1940), which had affirmed
174 Misc. 389, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 712 (Sup. Ct. 1940), opinion by Miller, J. See Note(1941) 54 HAxv. L. REv. 705.
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At common law, a physician had no privilege to refuse to divulge as a
witness, any information, no matter how confidential, which he had acquired
from a patient.5 The privilege as it exists today in about half the states is
wholly statutory, New York being the first state to ,confer the privilege.'
Since the enactment of the New York statutes in 1828,7 the courts have been
called upon ,many times to interpret their scope and purpose. Attempts to
restrict their scope to formal trials in courts of law have proved futile. Thus
Section 352 has been held applicable to an examination before a referee under
a statute providing for the taking of testimony of physicians before referees
in personal injury actions." Physicians have been allowed to assert the privi-
lege in examinations before trial, even though the general rule is that the
determination of the competency of interrogatories in such an examination
must await the trial of the action.9 Probate proceedings 0 and lunacy pro-
ceedings'- have also been held to be within the scope of the statutes. Sec-
tion 392 of the Code of Criminal Procedure makes Sections 352 and 354
of the Civil Practice Act applicable to criminal proceedings.' 2 A physician
has been accorded the privilege in order to protect a patient other than the
defendant in a criminal case,13 but where the exclusion of the physician's
testimony would have enabled a defendant charged with crime to escape
punishment the courts have admitted testimony which under a strict inter-
pretation of the statutes should perhaps have been excludedV1 l
None of the cases dealing with the scope of the statutes, however, has
ever presented the precise question in the instant case. Unhampered by
precedent, the cQurt largely rests its decision on considerations of purpose
or policy. By extending the privilege to witnesses in legislative investiga-
tions the decision declares that the court thinks the purpose of the statutes
can be carried out only if a physician is privileged to refuse to disclose informa-
tion whenever he is called, as a witness. If the purpose of the statutes is to
protect a patient from the shame of having the details of his ailments spread
5Zeiner v. Zeiner, 120 Conn. 161, 179 Atl. 644 (1935); People V. Austin, 199 N. Y.
446, 93 N. E. 57 (1910) ; Russell v. Jackson, 9 Hare 387 (Ch. 1851).
68 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2380.
7N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 352 was revised from CODE Cry. Paoc. § 834, which was
originally revised from REv. STAT., pt. 3, c. 7, tit. 3, § 73 (1829) ; N. Y. CIV. PpAc. ACT§ 354 was originally CODE Civ. PRoc. § 836.
8 Woernley v. Electromatic Typewriters, Inc., 271 N. Y. 228, 2 N. E. (2d) 638 (1936).9Lorde v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 252 App. Div. 643, 300 Misc. 721 (1st Dep't 1937);
Rodner v. Buchmab, 246 App. Div. 777, 284 N. Y. Supp. 99 (2d Dep't 1935).
'0In re Connor, 5 Silv. 261, 55 Hun 606 (1st Dep't 1889), aff'd, 124 N. Y. 663, 27
N. E. 413 (1891).
liMatter of Gates, 170 App. Div. 921, 154 N. Y. Supp. 782 (3d Dep't 1915).
12N. Y. CODE Calm. PRoc. § 392: "The rules of evidence in civil cases are applic-
able also to criminal cases, except as otherwise provided in this code." People v. Mur-
phy, 101 N. Y. 126, 4 N. E. 326 (1886), rev'g 37 Hun 638, 3 N. Y. Cr. R. 338 (Sup. Ct.
1886) ; cf. People v. Lay, 167 Misc. 431, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 251 (Co. Ct. 1938), affd, 254
App. Div. 372, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 325 (2d Dep't 1938), aff'd, 279 N. Y. 737, 18 N. E.
(2d) 686 (1938).
13 People v. Murphy, 101 N. Y. 126, 4 N. E. 327 (1886).
'
4People v. Lay, supra note 12 (legislature did not intend to furnish "the means of
protecting a criminal from just punishment"). People v. Harris, 136 N. Y. "423, 33
N. E. 65 (1893) (the statute is not intended to "shield a person charged with the
murder of his patient").
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before the public,15 then the decision carries out this purpose, for a patient
would be just as much disgraced by revelations made in legislative investiga-
tions as in judicial trials. But if the purpose is to increase public confidence
' in the medical profession and to encourage people to seek proper treatment,1"
then the decision seems to thwart this purpose. Without being able to ex-
amine all the pertinent records, it is impossible to tell whether the charges
of negligence in the treatment of patients at Lincoln Hospital are founded or
unfounded, and the doubts which may fester in the public mind as to the
quality of the service at the hospital destroy public confidence just as
effectively as would a complete disclosure of the facts, which indeed might
show the charges to be entirely erroneous. Particularly does the decision seem
to thwart the purpose of the statutes when one considers that if the patients
or the personal representatives of deceased patients had brought an action
either against the hospital or against the doctors, they could have subpoenaed
the records. 17 Why should not the City, as a representative not only of the
patients but also of the public at large, be allowed to examine them? As
Judge Finch says in his dissent: "[I]t is not unreasonable to require that
the protection of the individual by privilege must bow as against the welfare
and protection of large masses of citizens."' 8
But since the decision merely reflects the confusion which exists as to the
legislative purpose, any criticism should be directed toward the statutes them-
selves. As Professor Wigmore has shown,19 they rest upon a shaky basis
of reasoning and policy, and any extension of them to include legislative
investigations seems undesirable, particularly as applied to the facts of the
instant case. Here the statutes prevent the City of New York from exam-
ining the conditions existing in one of the City's own hospitals, even though
the City is empowered by the legislature to make the investigations. 20  Such
a result adds force to Professor Wigmore's recommendation that the statutes
be either abolished or modified in such a way that they will not in a particular
case prevent a court or a legislative committee from obtaining vitally neces-
sary information.2 1 Rex Rowland
25 Cases stating this view are: Woernley v. Electromatic Typewriters, Inc., 271 N. Y.
228, 2 N. E. (2d) 638 (1936) ; Steinberg v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 26a N. Y. 45, 188 N.
E. 152 (1933), rev'g 238 App. Div. 206, 264 N. Y. Supp. "399 (3d Dep't 1933) ; Hethier
v. Johns, 198 App. Div. 127, 189 N. Y. Supp. 605 (4th Dep't 191), rev'd on other
grounds, 233 N. Y. 370, 135 N. E. 60a (1922).
16Cases stating this view are: People v. Austin, 199 N. Y. 446, 93 N. E. 57 (1910);
Edington v. Ins. Co., 67 N. Y. 185 (1871). The Revisers' notes, published in an ap-
pendix to the second edition of the Revised Statutes [3 REv. STAT. '2d ed. 1836 7371,
state this to be the purpose of the statute in the following language: "[U)nless such
consultations are privileged, men will be incidentally punished by being obliged to 'suffer
the consequences of injuries without relief from the medical art, and without 'conviction
of any offense."
'
7Terier v. Dare, 146 App. Div. 375, 131 N. Y. Supp. 51 (3d Dep't 1911) ; People
v. Brecht, 120 App. Div. 769, 105 N. Y. Supp. 436 (lst'Dep't 1907), aff'd, 192 N. Y.
581, 85 N. E. 827 (1908); Hoyt v. Cornwall Hospital, 169 Misc. 361, 6 N. Y. S. (2d)
1014 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ; see also Green v. Nirenberg, 166 Misc. 652, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 81
(Sup. Ct. 1938).,
'8284 N. Y. 296, 303, 31 N. E. (2d) 31 (1940).
398 WiAGORm, loc. cit. supra note 6.
20Charter of the City of New York § 43.
218 WIGMORE, loc. cit. supra note 6. The American Bar Association in 1938
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Federal Practice: Appealability of orders and judgments of the United
States District Courts.-The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in a recent
case was called upon to add new material to the snowball of litigation on
the problem of appealability of final orders and judgments of the District
Courts. In Sidis v. F.-R. Pub. Corporation, 113 F. (2) 806 (C. C. A. 2d
194,,0), the plaintiff, a child prodigy of yesteryear, sued the F.-R. Publish-
ing Corporation of New York in the United States District Court. The
complaint set forth three "causes of action."'  The first charged a violation
of his right of privacy as recognized under the laws of five states; the second
was based upon an infringement of the rights given to the plaintiff under
Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law of New York while the third
cause of action alleged malicious libel under the laws of nine states.2
The defendant obtained an order postponing the time for answering the
last "cause of action" until the disposition of its motion for dismissal of the
first two causes on the ground that the contents of its answer would depend
to a great extent upon such disposition. The motion for dismissal by the
Publishing Corporatioi was granted and the plaintiff thereupon filed an
appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals from the dismissal order. It was
because the third "cause of action" remained undecided, that the question
of the appealability of the order of dismissal arose.3 judge Clark wrote
the opinion of the court on the law of the case but personally dissented from
the conclusion by the majority that this order was appealable. The majority
believed that the facts required to uphold the third claim were different
from those necessary to uphold the other two "causes of action" and held
the order to be appealable under the decision of Collins v. Metro-Goldwvyn
Pictures Corp.4 and F. R. C. P. Rule 54 (b) [28 U. S. C. A. following
Section 723 (c)]. The reasons for the majority's position were the differ-
ence in the proof of circulation of the defendant's magazine, the necessity of
showing malice under the last claim and the requisites of proving advertising
recommended that the state legislature adopt the following proviso with regard to
the privilege of nondisclosure accorded to physicians: "Provided that the presiding judge
of a superior court may compel such disclosure if in his opinion the same is necessary
to the proper administration of justice." 8 WIGMORE, 10c. cit. Mspra note 6.
See Callahan and Ferguson, Evidence and the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(1937) 47 YALE L. J. 194, 210, proposing that the physician-patient privilege be entirely
abolished.
1This phrase was set off by quotation marks in the opinion of the court. Evidently,
counsel in his brief referred to "causes of action" although under the new Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure the right to relief is embodied in a "claim." See FED. RULES
Civ. PRoc., Rule 8.2For discussion of the tort aspect of this case see (1940) 29 CALin. L. REv. 87;
(1940) 40 CoL. L. Rev. 1283; (1940) 89 U. oF PA. L. Rev. 251.
SSince the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts depends upon the finality of the order
appealed from, the court must consider the question of finality on its own motion
although appellees have not raised it. Collins v. Miller, 252 U. S. 364, 40 Sup. Ct.
347 (1920) ; Cory Bros. & Co., Ltd. v. United States, 47 F. (2d) 607 (C. C. A. 2d 1931);
Western Electric Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 37 F. (2d) 14 (C. C. A. 2d 1930);
United States v. Curran, 18 F. (2d) 953 (C. C. A. 2d 1927) ; City and County of San
Francisco v. McLaughlin, 9 F. (2d) 390 (C. C. A. 9th 1925).
4106 F. (2d) 83 (C. C. A. 2d 1939), cited with approval in Karl Kiefer Mach. Co. v.
U. S. Bottlers Machinery Co., 108 F. (2d) 469 (C. C. A. 7th 1939).
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use or purposes of trade under the second cause of action. In addition, the
convenience to the parties, the majority recognized, would be served by hold-
ing the order of dismissal to be appealable. From this position, judge Clark
dissented, stating that there was in the case but "a single transaction or
occurrence, and the asserted distinctions between the claims are only differ-
ing theories of legal recovery.",
The rule is well-established both by statute5 and decision 6 that the juris-
diction of the Circuit Courts of Appeal to review determinations of the
District Courts extends only to final judgments and orders with certain
exceptions not here applicable. The rule is simply stated. The determination
of finality, however, has proved a most difficult and oft-litigated problem.7
It has been stated that "a final decision ... is one which completely adjudicates
the rights of the parties to the suit, so that if it is affirmed the court below
will have nothing to do but to execute the judgment or decree which evidences
the decision it has already rendered." s  As a corollary, the principle has
become well settled that "an adjudication final in its nature as to a subject
distinct from the general subject of the litigation and affecting only the
parties to the particular controversy, may be reviewed without awaiting the
determination of the general litigation."9  Conversely, when the adjudication
is final in its nature as to the general subject of the litigation, it may be
subject to an appeal even in the absence of a determination of a separate
matter affecting the parties to such controversy only.10
The problem of finality, difficult as it was under the Conformity Act, has
become manifestly more perplexing with the advent of the new Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the new rules a litigant may assert in a
single suit any legal or equitable claims which he may have against the
adverse party."' Also, judgment may be given at any stage of the action.12
The freedom of pleading and practice allowed by these and other new rules's
has had its affect in the determination of the finality of an order or judgment
of the District Court.
The general rule in joinder cases had been stated by the Second Circuit
in Sheppy v. Stevens.' 4 The court held that all the claims in the suit were
to be taken as one judicial unit, all of which had to be decided before an
appeal could be taken to the Circuit Court.'5 The free joinder allowed
526 STAT. 828 (1891), as amended, 28 U. S. C. A. § 225 (Supp. 1939).6For a collection of cases wherein the question of finality was determined, see Rector
v. United States, 20 F. (2d) 845 (C. C. A. 8th 1927); 1 OHLINGER, FEDERAL PRAcrCE(1938) 696-700. See also Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal (1932)
41 YALE L. J. 539.
7Rector v. United States, 20 F. (2d) 845, 872 (C. C. A. 8th 1927).
SMorgan v. Thompson, 124 Fed. 203, 204 (C. C. A. 8th 1903).9United States v. River Rouge Co., 269 U. S. 411, 414, 46 Sup. Ct. 144 (1926);
Arnold v. Guimarin, 263 U. S. 427, 44 Sup. Ct. 144 (1923); Collins v. Miller, 252
U. S. 364, 40 Sup. Ct. 347 (1920); Williams v. Morgan, 111 U. S. 684, 4 Sup. Ct.
638 (1884).
'°United States v. River Rouge Co., 269 U. S. 411, 414, 46 Sup. Ct. 144 (1926).
"XRule 18.
'
2 Rule 54b.
13Rule 13 and 14.
14200 Fed. 946 (C. C. A. 2d 1912).
15The same principle was applied in Stromberg Motor Devices Co. v. Arnson, 239
Fed. 891 (C. C. A. 2d 1917) without citing the Sheppy case.
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by the new rules made this principle an archaism. The same court in the
case of Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., therefore, overruled16
the Sheppy case and attempted to set forth a pragmatic test of finality which
would gain the desired end of prompt disposition of appeals while yet pre-
serving "finality" as required by statute. In keeping with the policy innate
in the new rules, the court held that the judicial unit for the determination
of finality should be the occurrence or transaction upon which a particular
claim is based.1 7 Although the new rules omit reference to the term "cause
of action' 8s the concept of a judicial unit based on the transaction theory
forms the basis of an application of many of the rules.' 9 Thus the court
held a judgment would be considered to be final if it decided all the issues
involved in the particular transaction sued on in an action. In effect, it
indicated that regardless of the joinder of the claims allowed by the rules,
an appeal may be taken from a judgment determining one "cause of action"
if the claim or cause is defined on the basis of the transaction theory.20
The test of finality set forth in the Collins case is excellent 'in theory but
grave dangers lurk in its application. No definite test was presented for
defining the limits of a transaction although Judge Clark, in a concurring
opinion, did express his views on the transaction theory of a claim or cause
of action. In truth, no definite test can be presented. Subsequent decisions,
however, have helped to dissipate the uncertainty. In Atwater v. North
American Coal Corp.21 it was held that where two or more defendants are
attempted to be charged in common, an order dismissing the action as to
some but not all the defendants is not final.22 In a concurring opinion, Judge
IGThe court stated that it was following the decisions in Historical Pub. Co. v.
Jones Bros. Pub. Co., 231 Fed. 784 (C. C. A. 3d 1916); Scriven v. North, 134 Fed.
366 (C. C. A. 4th 1904) ; Klever v. Seawall, 65 Fed. 373 (C. C. A. 6th 1894).
170n page 85 of the court's opinion it is stated:
"While it is true that the new Rules do not purport to deal with matters of juris-
diction, see Rule 82, and consequently are not strictly binding for the purpose of
determining whether a judgment is 'final' in a jurisdictional sense . . ., they do
provide that the final determination of the issues material to a particular claim .. .
may be embodied in a 'judgment' terminating the action with respect to the claim
so disposed of. It seems unlikely that such a judgment can reasonably be regarded
as other than final and appealable."
18Much has been written on the question of the determination of a "cause of action."
For discussion see CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 75-78; Poamoy, CODE REMEDIEs(4th ed. 1904) §§ 347-349; Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 YALE L. J.
817; Clark, The Cause of Action (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 354; Gavit, The CodeCause of Action (1930) 30 COL. L. Rrv. 802; Gavit, A "Pragmatic Definition" of the
"Cause of Action?" (1933) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 129; Gavit, The Cause of Action-A
Reply (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 695; McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Actions(1925) 34 YALE L. J. 614.19Rules 10b, 13a, 13g, 15c, 54b.
2OSee Bowles v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 107 F. (2d) 169 (C. C. A. 4th 1939).
21111 F. (2d) 125 (C. C. A. 2d 1940).
22In this the court was following a general rule previously employed in Bank of
Rondout v. Smith, 156 U. S. 330, 15 Sup. Ct. 358 (1895); Hohurst v. Hamburg-
American Packet Co., 148 U. S. 262, 13 Sup. Ct. 590 (1893); Lockhart v. N. Y.
Life Ins. Co., 71 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 4th (1934); Hewitt v. McCormick Lumber
Co., 22 F. (2d) 925 (C. C. A. 2d 1927) ; Bush v. Leach, 22 F. (2d)i 296 (C. C. A.
2d 1927); General Electric Co. v. Allis-Chalmes Co., 194 Fed. 413 (C. C. A. 3d
1912) ; Menge v. Warringer, 120 Fed. 816 (C. C. A. 5th 1903). But see Hill v.
Chicago and Evanston R. R., 140 U. S. 52, 11 Sup. Ct. 690 (1891) ; McGill v. Com-
mercial Union Assurance Co., Ltd., 5 F. (2d) 589 (C. C. A. 4th 1925).
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Clark pointed out that the order also lacked finality because it dismissed
only two out of the four "legal theories" depended upon to prove the claim.
He pointed out that there was one transaction involved and since the order
did not completely dispose of the claim, it could not be regarded as final.
The test of finality adopted in the Collins case appears to make the appeal-
ability of an order or judgment dependent upon the facts of the particular
case. This imposes a degree of unpredictability which may prove an obstacle
to litigants. This condition is aggravated by the pronouncement of Judge
Clark to the effect that decisions of the extent of a claim or cause of action
in cases where res judicata, amendment of pleadings, joinder, counterclaims
or jurisdiction was in issue are not binding on the question of appealability. 23
The test does, however, allow room for discretion by the courts in the
interest of trial convenience. It is submitted that it is not altogether cer-
tain that the court in the principal case would have decided that the plaintiff
had lost his right to appeal because of lapse of time if he had awaited a
determination of the third cause of action and had sought a review of the
whole case in one appeal. Since a review of the dismissal order might
have been permitted in such a case, there lies the possibility of an alternative
appeal-a result which may be the means of eliminating any injustice due
to the uncertainty as to the finality of an order.24
In the principal case, there is little doubt that the plaintiff had three
distinct causes of action using that phrase in its older connotation. Even
under the transaction theory, separate sets of operative facts may be found.
The facts or transaction involved in the two claims dismissed are different
from those in the third claim as pointed out by the majority. In view of
this fact and the convenience to the parties, it is submitted that the order
of dismissal did cover a separate transaction and so constituted a judicial
unit for the purposes of an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Robert S. Lesher
Federal Securities Act: Civil liabilities for issuance of false registration
statement: Methods of uniting actions and assigning claims.-Forty-five
purchasers of stock of the Continental Service Company assigned and con-
veyed their shares to plaintiff as trustee. Yet plaintiff was not a true pur-
chaser but rather an assignee of possible claims of the stockholders arising
out of false items as to processing taxes in the company's registration state-
ment issued by defendants. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin1 decided that
the civil remedy under Section 112 of the Federal Securities Act of 19333
available to a purchaser 4 of securities against the parties responsible for the
23Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F. (2d) 83 (C. C. A. 2d 1939)
(concurring opinion).24See (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 223.
'Per Rosenberry, C. J.
215 U. S. C. A. § 77k.
315 U. S. C. A. §§ 77a-77aa.4The fact that Section 77k gives a remedy (on certain conditions) to any person
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issuance of a false registration statement is non-assignable, since the action-
similar to an "action for deceit"-is "penal" in nature rather than "remedial."
Wogahn v. Stevens, 236 Wis. 122, 294 N. W. 503 (1940).'
The old rule that all ex delicto actions for damages abated on the death
of either party was modified by early English statutes5 to allow actions in
favor of and against personal representatives for injuries to real and per-
sonal property. In more recent times, the test in a given case has been
whether or not the action is in nature,penal or remedial, 6 the action abating
in the former instance and surviving both death and assignment 7 in the
latter.8 The underlying test as to the penal9 or remedial nature of a statutory
cause of action is the relation of the relief desired to the offense alleged. If
there is sought an arbitrary, deterring punishment, the action is clearly penal;
if the purpose is to secure reasonable compensation for a loss having causal
connection with the breach of legal obligation, it is, a remedial proceeding. 10
The holding of the instant case that the cause of action given by the Act
is penal seems not justified on the basis of the above well recognized tests.
Civil liability is imposed by Section 1111 to compensate the defrauded and
deluded purchaser for his loss due to reliance on the illegitimate portion of
the registration statement; and for that loss only are the parties to the state-
ment liable.12
Cases arising under similar state and federal statutes tend not to sustain
the conclusion of the Wisconsin court. Here again the test is whether or
not the liability incurred bears any causal relation to the loss suffered-
the line being drawn between actions to recover forfeitures or penalties and
those merely to compensate the party aggrieved.' 3  This distinction is not
"acquiring" such securities should serve to limit the inweption but not necessarily the
subsequent transfer of a cause of action.
54 EDW. III, c. 7; 31 EDw. III, c. 11; 3 & 4 Wm. IV, c. 42, § 3. These statutes are a
part of American common law. Sullivan v. Associated Billposters & Distributors, 6 F.
(2d) 1000 (C. C. A. 2d 1925).
GBenton v. Deininger, 21 F. (2d) 659 (W. D. N. Y. 1927) ; Stevens v. Overstolz, 43
Fed. 465 (E. D. Mo. 1890); Auslen v. Thompson, 101 P. (2d) 135 (Cal. App. 1940).
But see Sullivan v. Associated Billposters & Distributors, 6 F. (2d) 1000 (C. C. A.
2d 1925).
7Unfortunately, the cases reason in a circle; if the question is of survivability, a case
of assignment is thought to rule it, and e converso. Compare 6 C. J. S. (1937) 1079,
§ 30 (stating the test of assignability to be whether or not the action survives the death
of the party) with 1 C. J. S. (1936) 179, § 132 (stating "one test of survivability" to
be the assignability of the cause of action).
8Each jurisdiction has its own survival (and often, assignment) statutes. These must
be consulted in every instance.
9
"[T]he words 'penal' and 'penalty' have many different shades of meaning, and are
in fact among the most elastic terms known to law." Kirkpatrick, J., in Ward v. Rice,
29 F. Supp. 714, 715 (E. D. Pa. 1939).
10Shonts v. Hirliman, 28 F. Supp. 478 (S. D. Cal. 1939); Benton v. Deininger, 21 F.(2d) 659 (W. D. N. Y. 1927) ; Agndo v. County of Monterey, 13 Cal. (2d) 285, 89 P.(2d) 400 (1939) ; Western Mtg. & Guar. Co. v. Gray, 215 Cal. 191, 8 P. (2d)' 1016
(1932); Ham v. Robinson Co., 146 Ga. 442, 91 S. E. 483 (1917); Brown v. Kildea,
58 Wash. 184, 108 Pac. 452 (1910).
1115 U. S. C. A. § 77k.
1215 U. S. C. A. § 77k(e), as amended 48 STAT. 907 (1934). Section 11(f) [15 U. S.
C. A. § 77k (f) I provides for contribution among the wrongdoers as in cases of contract.13Benton v. Deininger, 21 F. (2d) 659 (W. D. N. Y. 1927) (liability under National
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strictly adhered to, however, in the cases interpreting the treble damage pro-
vision of the Sherman Act'4 and the double compensation provision of the
Fair Labor Standards Act,15 for in such cases the courts hold the actions
to be none the less remedial. 16
The court's analogy to an "action for deceit"-while valid' 7-is not
determinative of the question,' 8 for a number of jurisdictions have held
assignable a cause of action for fraud in the sale of shares of stock.19
Banking Act [12 U. S. C. A. §§ 93, 1612. of bank directors to stock purchasers relying
on false reports of bank's condition: held remedial and survivable) ; Western Mtg. &
Guar. Co. v. Gray, 215 Cal. 191, 8 P. (2d) 1016 (1932) (statutory liability [CAL. Civ.
CoDE (Deering, 1937) § 309] of corporate directors for contracting debts in excess of
capital stock: held penal and non-assignable, because directors were liable for full
amount of excess debts authorized by them, regardless of whether or not the loss was
occasioned by their acts).
Section 18a of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [15 U. S. C. A. § 78r (a)]' is
analogous to Section 11 of the Securities Act [15 U. S. C. A. § 77k] and seems clearly
compensatory.
For interpretations of the Securities Act, see S. & E. C. v. Starmont, 31 F. Supp.
264 (E. D. Wash. 1939) (holding the Act a "remedial enactment" rather than a "penal
statute," for purposes of statutory construction), and Shonts v. Hirliman, 28 F. Supp.
478 (S. D. Cal. 1939) (holding § 77k "purely compensatory," to demonstrate necessity
for proving actual damage).
1415 U. S. C. A. § 15.
'529 U. S. C. A. § 216(b).
16Sherman Act: Hicks v. Bedkins Co., 87 F. (2d) 583 (C. C. A. 9th 1937); Sullivan
v. Associated Billposters & Distributors, 6 F. (2d) 1000, 42 A. L. R. 503, 520 (C. C. A.
2d 1925); United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 232 Fed. 574
(C. C. A. 2d 1916); Imperial Film Exchange v. General Film Co., 244 Fed. 985 (S. D.
N. Y. 1915). Contra: Caillouet v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 250 Fed. 639 (E. D. La.
1917). Cf. Sampliner v. Motion Picture Patents Co., 254 U. S. 233, 41 Sup. Ct. 79
(1920), in which the Supreme Court held that a non-champertous assignment of a treble
damage claim to an attorneys is valid.
Fair Labor Standards Act: Hargrave v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 36 F. Supp.
233 (E. D. Okla. 1941).
17The essential elements of deceit are (a) representation, (b) falsity, (c) scienter,
(d) deception and (e) injury.' Ochs v. Woods, 221 N. Y. 335, 117 N. E. 305 (1917).
The liabilities under Section 77k meet these requirements. The measure of damages
adopted is that used by a minority of American jurisdictions and is commonly known
as the "out-of-pocket" rule. Shonts v. Hirliman, 28 F. Supp. 478 (S. D. Cal. 1939).
This view, as opposed to the "loss-of-bargain" rule, was first established as the federal
rule in Smith v. Bolles, 132 U. S. 125, 10 Sup. Ct. 39 (1889). See note (1940) 26
CORNELL L. Q. 133.
18But cf. Geipel v. Peach [1917] 2 Ch. 108, holding a suit under a [nearly identical
English statute a mere common law tort action analogous to deceit, which, therefore, did
not survive the death of the feasor. Section 84 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act
of 1908 [8 EDw. VII, c. 69]. However, the principal basis of decision seems to have been
that defendant's executor would be unable to prove what his testator did or did not
believe.
19McLeod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho 64, 249 Pac. 254 (1926) ; Walker v. Sanford, 126 Misc.
597, 214 N. Y. Supp. 202 (Sup. Ct. 1926), aff'd w. o. op., 217 App. Div. 727, 216 N. Y.
Supp. 932 (1st Dep't 1926) ; Tomerlin v. Mittendorf, 286 S. W. 477 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926). Contra: Grabow v. Bergeth, 59 N. D. 214, 229 N. W. 282 (1930). Cf. Wik-
strom v. Yolo Fliers Club, 206 Cal. 461, 274 Pac. 959 (1929) (action for fraud in sale
of real property: held, assignable) ; Stroman v. Atlas Ref. Co., 112 Neb. 187, 199 N. W.
26 (1924) (same). But cf. Phillips v. Malone, 223 Ala. 381, 136 So. 793 (1931) (action
for misrepresentation in sale of real property: held, personal and non-assignable). See
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Could the forty-five purchasers conveniently reach the desired result by
employing a procedure different from that here attempted? It would seem
not. A representative action probably would have failed on the ground that
class suits-whether "genuine" or "spurious"--generaly are not permitted
in cases involving tort claims.2 0 There is neither common subject matter
nor an identical issue of fact, for each purchaser is interested only in his
own stock2 ' and each must prove personal reliance on the false statement.2 2
It apparently would have been possible under the Wisconsin joinder statute23
to join all the purchasers as plaintiffs2 4 and so to avoid the assignment
question. Yet it is likely that the very purpose of the method used in the
principal case was to relieve the individual investofs of the obligations and
responsibilities of prosecuting an action. Requiring claimants to join as
plaintiffs would discourage actions by holders of small claims. A fortiori
the average small shareholder would not prosecute an individual action.
Neither could the court well have held the "assignment" a power of attorney
also State ex tel. Park Nat'l Bank v. Globe Indemnity Co., 332 Mo. 1089, 61 S. W.
(2d) 733 (1933).
Though the statutes of each jurisdiction must be consulted, usually a fraud action
meeting the requirements necessary to bring it under the statutes would meet the com-
mon law requirements for survivable fraud actions. See 3 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF
LEsGAL LIABiLiTY (1906) 86, 87, stating the common law rule: "But where property is
obtained by a deceit or fraudulent device of any sort, the cause of action is assignable,
for here the injury is done in respect of the particular property which is wrongfully
acquired." Compare, however, Grabow v. Bergeth, supra, holding that a fraud causing
pecuniary loss is not a "damage to goods" (within the meaning of the North Dakota
statute) of deceased and that a cause of action therefor does not survive and is not
assignable.20Associated Almond Growers v. Wymond, 42 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 9th 1930); Will-
cox v. Harriman Securities Corp., 10 F. Supp. 532 (S. D. N. Y. 1933); Society Milion
Athena, Inc. v. Nat'l Bank of Greece, 281 N. Y. 282, 22 N. E. (2d) 374 (1939) ; Brenner
v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 276 N. Y. 230, 11 N. E. (2d) 890 (1937) ; Elkind v.
Chase Nat'l Bank, 259 App. Div. 661, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 213 (1st Dep't 1940), aff'd inem.,
284 N. Y. *158, 31 N. E. (2d) 198 (1940) ; Hardie & Lane v. Chiltern, [1928] 1 K. B.
601 (1926) ; see Hansberry v. Lee, 61 Sup. Ct. 115 (U. S. 1940), noted (1941) 26 CoR-
NLL L. Q. 317. But see Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 108 F. (2d) 51 (C. C. A.
3d 1939), rev'd on. other grounds, 61 Sup. Ct. 229 (U. S. 1940).
21But see Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 108 F. (2d) 51 (C. C. A. 3d 1939),
to the effect that in a proceeding under Section 12 of the Securities Act [15 U. S. C. A.
§ 771], a "spurious" class suit may be maintained even though the judgments differ in
amount.2 2
"There may be enough similarity in the issues to warrant joining in one suit for
rescission (see Akely v. Kinnicutt, 238 N. Y. 466, 144 N. E. 682 [1924]), but the main-
tenance of a class suit is quite a different thing. The issues are not identical, and even
if they were there is no common subject matter. Each defrauded person is interested
in his own stock and not that of any other victim. On the authorities it is settled that
a representative suit by one of numerous defrauded persons in behalf of himself and
others will not lie. [Citing cases]" Patterson, J., in Willcox v. Harriman Securities
Corp., 10 F. Supp. 532, 534 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
23WIS. STAT. (1939) § 260.10. "All persons having an interest in the subject of the
action and in obtaining the relief demanded may be joined as plaintiffs, except as other-
wise provided by law."2 4Many other jurisdictions have similarly liberal joinder statutes. See, e.g., Rule 20,
FEDERAL RuLFs OF CivIm PROCEDURE, 28 U. S. C. A. following § 723c; CAL. CODE Civ.
PROC. (Deering, 1937) § 378; ILL. REv. STAT. (1937) c. 110, § 147; N. Y. CiVI. PRAc-
TICE Acm § 209.
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constituting the plaintiff an attorney in fact, because the cases generally deny
an agent for the sole purpose of suit the right to sue either as a real party
in interest or as trustee of an express trust.2 5
Though Wogahn v. Stevens may represent the court's fear that a contrary.
holding might "open the flood gates of litigation" by encouraging assign-
ments to professional litigants, that fear seems unjustified since recovery is
so difficult under the civil liability provisions2 6 of the Act.2 7  In the absence
of proof of champerty or maintenance, there is little reason to deny relief
in the form as sought in the principal case.
John Wesley Reed
Future Interests: New York powers irn trust to apply income during a
minority after two lives-There is no general authority in the laws of
New York to continue a trust during a minority after two lives in being at
the creation of the estate. However a power in trust during the added
minority, sometimes referred to as an administrative title, may be used to
accomplish the purposes of a trust. This is illustrated by In re Eveland's
Will, 284 N. Y. 64, 29 N. E. (2d) 473 (1940). A testator left surviving
a widow, a son, and three grandchildren by that son. The testator created
a residuary trust, income to his widow and son for their lives, and pro-
vided that upon the death of the survivor, seventy-five per cent of the
principal should be paid over to a named grandson, and the balance to be
distributed equally among his other grandchildren. By codicil, the testator
provided that the grandchildren should receive their shares when each
reached the age of thirty-five. At the death of the widow, who survived
the son, the named grandchild was over twenty-one, but under thirty-five
years of age. The two other grandchildren were infants. The Court of
Appeals held that each grandchild became vested indefeasibly with the title
to his or her share of the remainder on the death of the widow. The Court
said that a provision that the trustee hold the fund to which the grand-
children have title until each reaches twenty-one is not invalid, although
in apparent violation of Section 11 of the Personal Property Law.1  The
25Lewis v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 39 F. (2d) 834 (C. C. A. 7th 1930), cert. denied, 282
U. S. 869, 51 Sup. Ct. 76 (1930) ; Spencer v. Standard C. & M. Corp., 237 N. Y. 479,
143 N. E. 651 (1924) ; MooRE, FEERAL PRACTICE (1938) 2058-61.2615 U. S. C. A. §§ 77k, 771.
27See note on Shonts v. Hirliman, 28 F. Supp. 478 (S. D. Cal. 1939) in (1940) 38
MIc H. L. REv. 1103, listing cases to date under these sections.
1N. Y. PRas. PROP. LAw § 11: "The absolute ownership of personal property shall
not be suspended by any limitation or condition, for a longer period than during the
continuance and until the termination of not more than two lives in being at the date
of the instrument containing such limitation or condition, or, if such instrument be a
last will and testament, for not more than two lives in being at the death of the tesfator;
except that a contingent gift in remainder may be made on a prior gift in remainder, to
take effect in the event that the persons to whom the first remainder is limited die
under the age of twenty-one years, or on any other contingency by which the interest
of such persons may be determined before they attain full age. For the purposes of
this section, a minority is deemed a part of a life, and not an absolute term equal to
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trust was not intended to be continued after the death of the widow. Even
if it were, the invalid provision for its continuance till the grandchildren
reached thirty-five could be excised without upsetting the dominant plan
of the testator. The court directed that the share of the grandson who was
of age be paid to him immediately, and the shares of the other two grand-
children be paid to each on attaining twenty-one, the infants to receive the
income as it accrued, in accordance with the implied intent of the testator.
Trusts to apply the income of land and personalty do not at common law
interfere with the alienability of property if all interests vest within lives
in being and twenty-one years. The beneficiary could alienate his interest
or destroy the trust by joining with the trustee.2  However, in New York,
these trusts, perhaps through inadvertence, are brought into conflict with
the statutes on the suspension of the power of alienation.3 Section 42 of the
Real Property Law provides that every estate shall be void which attempts
to suspend the power of alienation beyond two lives in being at the creation
of the estate. The absolute power of alienation of realty is declared to be
suspended when there are no persons in being by whom an absolute fee
in possession can be conveyed.4 Trusts to receive and apply or pay over
the income to the use of any person necessarily suspend the power of aliena-
tion ;5 alienation by the trustee in contravention of the trust is void, 6 and
the beneficiary can not assign or anticipate his interest. 7 Therefore, dur-
the possible duration of such minority. Lives in being or a minority in being shall
include a child begotten before the creation of the estate but born thereafter. In other
respects limitations of future or contingent interests in personal property, are subject
to the rules prescribed in relation to future estates in real property."2Bryan v. Knickerbacker, 1 Barb. Ch. 409 (N. Y. 1846) ; Saunders v. Vautier, 1 Cr.
& Ph. 240 (Ch. 1841).3Professors Powell and Whiteside, Ride Against Perpetuities and Related Matters,
NEw YoRK STATE LAv REVISION ColISSION REPORT, LEG. Doc. (1936) No. 65 (H),
p. 56. Section 96 (3) of the Real'Property Law authorizes express trusts to receive
rents and profits of real property and apply them to the use of any person. Trusts of
personal property may be created for any lawful purpose. Beardsley v. Hotchkiss,
96 N. Y. 201, 216 (1884).4Section 11 of the Personal Property Law provides that absolute ownership of per-
sonal property shall not be suspended for more than two lives in being at the creation
of the estate. The statute does not define "absolute ownership" or "suspended." The
courts have given the same meaning to the terms "suspension of the absolute power of
alienation" contained in Section 42 of the Real Property Law and "absolute ownership"
of personal property. Matter of Wilcox, 194 N. Y. 288, 87 N. E. 497 (1909). The
statutory definition of "suspension of the absolute power of alienation" (absence of
persons who can convey a fee in possession) has been applied to "suspension of the
absolute ownership" of personal property. Sawyer v. Cubby, 146 N. Y. 193, 196, 40
N. E. 869 (1895).
GCoster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265 (N. Y. 1835). There is, however, no suspension
of the power of alienation where the trustee is given power to terminate the trust
[Van Cott v. Prentice, 104 N. Y. 45, 10 .E. 257 (1887)] or where the beneficiary is
the settlor [Schenck v. Barnes, 156 N. Y. 316, 50 N. E. 967 (1898)1.6REAL PROP. LAw § 105. The same rule is applied to personalty. Genet v. Hunt,
113 N. Y. 158, 168, 21 N. E. 91 (1889).
TRFAL PRoP. LAw § 103; Matter of Wentworth, 230 N. Y. 176, 129 N. E. 646 (1920).
The same rule is applied to personalty. "There is manifest propriety in assimilating as
far as practicable the rules governing trusts and limitation of real and personal property,
and the tendency in this direction has been very marked in the decisions of the courts."
Cochrane v. Schell, 140 N. Y. 516, 534, 35 N. E. 971 (1894).
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ing the continuance of these trusts, a fee in possession may not be conveyed.
Section 11 of the Personal Property Law and Section 42 of the Real
Property Law, which declare that there shall be no suspension of the power
of alienation beyond two lives in being at the creation of the estate, permit one
restricted exception: a limitation in remainder after two lives to an infant
may be followed by a contingent limitation over if he should die under
twenty-one or upon some other contingency resolvable during his minority.
These sections in terms refer only to legal estates. Section 16 of the Per-
sonal Property Law and Section 61 of the Real Property Law allow trusts
during the minority following ,two lives to receiv&e and accumulate the rents
of real property for the benefit of an infant.8 The leading case of Manice
v. Manice9 illustrates these technical provisions. The testator directed his
trustees to receive and apply the income from his entire estate, real and
personal, during the life of his widow, and on her death to retain in trust
a share for each of his three daughters. The trustees wer6 directed at the
death of'each daughter to divide her share into as many parts as she should
leave children surviving, and to retain one of such sub-shares for each child,
accumulate the income during minority, and pay over the principal and
accumulations to him at his majority. If any such child should die under
twenty-one his sub-share is to go to his living issue, or if none, to the
survivors, or in case of default of issue, to the testator's heirs at law. Thus,
we see that the statutes authorize not only the continuance of trusts for more
than two lives during the restricted minority exception but also during the
lives of persons not in being at the creation of the estate.
The trust in the Manice case was to accumulate the rents for the grand-
children. The statutes do not touch on the question whether during this
period there may be a trust to distribute the income. The answer is still
not free from doubt. There are some indications in the cases that the trust
would be upheld.10
Aside from the possibility of providing for a trust to apply the income
during the restricted minority exception, there is a settled method of pro-
viding income for a minor from funds which have been held in trust from
two lives. The minor need not have been in being at the creation of the
estate. This may be done by providing for the termination of the trust
after two lives, at which time the estate is given to the minor absolutely,
but mere custody is postponed until majority, income in the interim being
given to the infant.'
8 See Pray v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 508 (1883).
943 N. Y. 303 (1871). The court held the direction to accumulate during the minority
of grandchildren invalid as to personalty. Section 11 was amended in 1929 to permit
suspension of the absolute ownership of personal property during a minority following
two lives under the same restrictions as provided in Section 42 of the Real Property Law.
IOMatter of Wilcox, 194 N. Y. 288, 87 N. E. 497 (1909) ; Hardenbergh v. McCarthy,
130 App. Div. 538, 114 N. Y. Supp. 1073 (1st Dep't 1909). See Chaplin, Trusts to Apply
Rents during a Minority (1926) 26 CoL. L. REv. 671.
"lThe leading case is Matter of Trevor, 239 N. Y. 6, 16, 145 N. E. 66 (1924). See
also Fulton Trust Co. v. Phillips, 218 N. Y. 573, 578, 113 N. E. 558 (1916) ; Steinway
v. Steinway, 163 N. Y. 183, 57 N. E. 312 (1900) ; Vanderpoel v. Loew, 112 N. Y. 167,
19 N. E. 481 (1889); Van Brunt v. Van Brunt, 111 N. Y. 178, 19 N. E. 60 (1888) ;
Beardsley v. Hotchkiss, 96 N. Y. 201 (1884); Bliven v. Seymour, 88 N. Y. 469 (1882);
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The one to whom custody of the corpus is given is said to perform his
duties not as trustee, but as the donee of a power in trust, or on an adminis-
trative or executive title.12  The donee of the power may be given entire
charge and management of realty or personalty,'3 authority to collect and
apply the rents and income, and make payments out of the corpus.' 4 The
performance of the duties does not suspend the absolute power of alienation.
The courts say that an infant could not personally have actual control and
management of the property, and if the instrument withholds custody from the
infant, it goes no farther than the laW does. Title is irithe infant, and the
only hindrance to his conveying an absolute fee in possession is the general
disability of infants.' 5 The infant takes the fee absolutely and indefeasibly,
and, in case of his dying under age, the fee vests in his heirs and not in the
heirs of the testator.16
It is clear that an intended trust cannot be held to be a mere provision for
custody to avoid an unlawful suspension.' 7  The task of the draftsman is to
make clear the intention that the trust terminate within two lives. The prop-
erty must be transferred within the same period to the infant absolutely,
custody only, and not possession in the technical sense, being withheld.18
Both gift of income during minority to the infant 19 and lack of direction for
the distribution of income have been taken as indications that the property
Smith v. Edwards, 88 N. Y. 92 (1882) ; Everitt v. Everitt, 29 N. Y. 39 (1864) ; I. re
Korn, 171 Misc. 409, 12 N. Y. S. (Zd) 459 (Surr. Ct. 1939) ; In re Rolston's Estate,
170 Misc. 548, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 660 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
'
2 Steinway v. Steinway, 163 N. Y. 183, 200, 57 N. E. 312 (1900) : "It may be con-
ceded that they [the trustees] have an administrative title, such as executors usually
have to the personal property of their testator, for the purposes of administration, good
against all the world except the beneficiaries, but as to them a mere aid and instrument
to pass it forward to them in the due course of administration as the law and the will
appoints, free and clear of further needs or liens on the estate."
'
3 Steinway v. Steinway, 163 N. Y. 183, 57 N. E. 312 (1900) ; Matter of Seebeck, 140
N. Y. 241, 247, 35 N. E. 429 (1893) ; Starr v. Starr, 132 N. Y. 154, 30 N. E. 384 (1892) ;
Robert v. Coming, 89 N. Y. 225 (1882) ; Onondaga T. D. Co. v. Price, 87 N. Y. 542
(1882) ; Heermans v. Robertson, 64 N. Y. 332, 346 (1876) ; Tucker v. Tucker, 5 N. Y.
408 (1851).
14Henderson v. Henderson, 113 N. Y. 1, 20 N. E. 814 (1889); Van Brunt v. Van
Brunt, 111 N. Y. 178, 19 N. E. 60 (1888). The principal case, at page 74, indicates
that the testator could validly direct an accumulation during the added minority. CHAP-
LIN, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATIOx (3d ed. 1928) § 270 says that this may
be done only where the remainder "is defeasible during the minority and thus within
the restricted minority exception." We have found no case directly in point. The
language of Sections 16 of the Personal Property Law and 61 of the Real Property
Law is broad enough to permit an accumulation during the minority after two lives
even where the minor is given the remainder indefeasibly.
15 Matter of Trevor, 239 N. Y. 6, 16, 145 N. E. 66 (1924) ; Everitt v. Everitt, 29
N. Y. 39, 75-79 (1864). CHAPLIN, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION (3d ed.
1928) § 173.
16Quade v. Bertsch, 65 App. Div. 600, 72 N. Y. Supp. 916 (2d Dep't 1901), affd,173
N. Y. 615, 66 N. E. 1115 (1903) ; Radley v. Kuhn, 97 N. Y. 26 (1884).
'
TMatter of Chittick, 243 N. Y. 304, 318-319, 153 N. E. 83 (1926); Garvey v. Mc-
Devitt, 72 N. Y. 556 (1878).
'sEveritt v. Everitt, 29 N. Y. 39, 75-79 (1864) ; CHAPLIN, op. cit. supra note 15, § 165.
19Van Brunt v. Van Brunt, 111 N. Y. 178, 187, 19 N. E. 60 (1888); Robert v. Corn-
ing, 89 N. Y. 225, 241 (1882).
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has been given to the infant absolutely.20 The chief distinction between a
trust and a power in trust is that in a trust title is vested in the trustee,
whereas in a power in trust the beneficiary has title.21 The cases often loosely
refer to the donee of a power in trust as a trustee. This is perhaps done only
to indicate the fiduciary relationship to the holder of the legal estate. The
practice is unwise and confusing. The use of the word "trustee" should be
carefully avoided in creating a power in trust.
Often a limitation may be construed as a trust or a power in trust. It is
a settled rule of construction that a trust will not be raised from general
language and apparent intention only to be destroyed.22
The principal case, it is believed, announces, a new rule in holding that
custody may not be detained longer than the minority. The court reveals
no reason for the limitation. The statutes provide none, and, according to
the, theory of powers in trust, none should be made. The theory of, a power
in trust is that it does not suspend the power of alienation.2 The only
hindrance to alienation is that which springs from an infant's disability to
convey. Once he comes of age, even though the will provides that the corpus
is to be withheld till thirty-five, he can convey clear title. In fact, the Court
of Appeals in Everitt v. Everitt24 said that perfect title could be conveyed
during infancy. The Court of Appeals in Vanderpoel v. Loe& 5 upheld de-
tention of the custody of property until the grandchildren reached the age of
thirty, following a trust that could continue for two lives in being at the
creation of the estate.
A trust which the trustee can terminate need not be limited within lives
in being and a minority.26 Similarly, a power in trust after two lives should
not be limited to a minority. In neither instance, assuming all interests vest
within two lives, is there a suspension of thd power of alienation. In both,
it is possible that property inay not be alienated within lives in being and
a minority. It seems that a testator by his direction could not make the
beneficial interest under a power in trust inalienable. The cases say that
the beneficiary has an absolute estate, and thus any restraint on alienation
should be held illegal and ineffective.2 7  Therefore, it is believed that no
2 0See principal case at page 68. See also Quade v. Bertsch, 65 App. Div. 610, 72 N. Y.
Supp. 916 (2d Dep't 1901), aff'd, 173 N. Y. 615, 66 N. E. 1115 (1903). It should be
noted that creditors of the beneficiary of a power in trust would not be limited to the
remedies of the creditors of the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust, who can reach only
income not necessary for customary maintenance of beneficiary [REAL PROP. LAW § 98,
Williams v. Thorn, 70 N. Y. 270 (1877) (applying statute to realty and personalty)]
and ten percent of income of trust provided the income amounts to more than $12.00 a
week [Civ. PRAc. AcT § 684, Matter of Irving Trust Co., 267 N. Y. 102, 195 N. E.
811 (1935)].21Cochrane v. Schell, 140 N. Y. 516, 531, 35 N. E. 971" (1894) ; Tilden v. Green,
130 N. Y. 29, 53, 28 N. E. 880 (1891). CrAHLIx, ExPREss TRUSTS AND POWERS (1897)
§ 35.22Henderson v. Henderson, 113 N. Y. 1, 20 N. E. 814 (1889); Post v. Hoover, 33
N. Y. 593 (1865) ; Tucker v. Tucker, 5 N. Y. 409 (1851).28See supra note 15.2429 N. Y. 39, 75-79 (1864).
25112 N. Y. 167, 19 N. E. 481 (1889).
26Van Cott v. Prentice, 104 N. Y. 45, 10 N. E. 257 (1887).27See Continental Insurance Co. v. N. Y.,, N. H. & H. R. R., 187 N.q Y. 225, 237, 79
N. E. 1026 (1907).
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policy of the statute would be frustrated by allowing the power in trust to
continue beyond the minority of the grandchildren. The principal case on
this point, however, is unequivocal. The previous authority must be taken
as overruled.
The court followed sound authority in holding that were there an invalid
direction for the continuance of the property, in trust for the grandchildren,
the provision could be excised and the remainders accelerated. 28 The prin-
cipal parts of the testamentary scheme are being preserved; the excision
gives immediate effect fo a remainder which would otherwise be postponed
without changing the persons who take or their shares. The court, however,
held that a power in trust was created, and being limited for too long a
time, it could be upheld for the legal limit, the minority of the grandchildren.
Accumulations limited for too long a period are by statute invalid only for
the excess.29 Trusts limited for too long a period are by statute declared
void.3 0 This has been construed not to apply where only a portion is invalid
and the offending part can be excised without too much distortion of the
testamentary scheme. The principal case holds that powers in trust limited
for too long a time are invalid only for the excess. Perhaps this foreshadows
a tendency in the court to enforce trusts created for an unlawful term for the
length of time the law allows even where the limitation is a "mere continuum,"
"a gift essentially unbroken."3' This, however, is unlikely in view of the
express words of the statute that "every future estate shall be void in its
creation..." if it unlawfully suspends the power of alienation.
2
William G. DeLamater
Bernard R. Rapoport
Insurance: Insurable interest of corporation in lifqt of "key" man.-
In Wagner v. National Engraving Co., 30 IV. E. (2d) 750 (Iii. App. 1940),
Nelleson was the owner of one-third of the stock of the defendant corpora-
tion. The corporation, consisting of only three men, was run very much like
a partnership, no dividends ever being declared or salaries paid, and at
the end of the year the profits were split three ways. For six years the
profits ranged from $6,000 to $12,000 for each man per year. Nelleson was
the superintendent of the shop and expert in the use of a process necessary
to the business. In 1929, at a directors' meeting, the three men agreed in
writing that in the event of the death of any one, his personal representatives
280liver v. Wells, 254 N. Y. 451, 173 N. E. 676 (1930) ; Matter of Durand, 250 N. Y.
45, 164 N. E. 737 (1928) ; Matter of Gallien, 247 N. Y. 195, 160 N. E. 8 (1928) ; Kalish
v. Kalish, 166 N. Y. 368, 375, 59 N. E. 917 (1900).
29REAL PRop. LAW § 61; PERS. PROP. LAW § 16.
S0Section 42 of the Real Property Law says that estates creating an unlawful sus-
pension are void. Section 11 of the Personal Property Law says that estates shall not
be limited for an unlawful term. The statute does not expressly make these unlawful
estates void. The Personal Property Law has been construed to be like the Real Property
Law and the trusts are void in their entirety. Matter of Durand, 250 N. Y. 45, 53, 164
N. E. 737 (1928).
s'Cardozo, J., in Matter of Horner, 237 N. Y. 489, 494, 143 N. E. 655 (1924).
32REAL PROP. LAW § 42. (Italics added).
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would be obligated to sell his stock to the corporation for $15,000. It was
further provided that to enable the corporation to pay this $15,000, each
of the stockholders would procure that amount of insurance on his life,
making the corporation the beneficiary, premiums to be paid by the corpora-
tion.1 On the day this contract was executed, Nelleson took out two
policies on his life, one for $5,000 and the other for $10,000, the latter con-
taining a provision for double liability in case of accidental death. He died
in 1936 from accidental drowning and the corporation collected on both
policies, a total of $25,000. The master further found that there was an
oral agreement between the corporation and Nelleson at the time of the
contract for the inclusion of the double liability clause.
The executrix brought suit on behalf of Nelleson's estate on the theory
that the insurable interest of the corporation in his life was only to the
extent of $15,000 and claimed the $10,000 paid under the double liability
clause. The court held that the corporation had an insurable interest in
the entire amount of the policy and therefore denied the claim of the executrix.
Insurable interest, in life insurance cases, has generally been defined as
any pecuniary interest in the continued existence of the person whose life
is insured2 or, stated another way, an expectation of gain by his remaining
alive or loss by his death.3 The first inquiry is whether an insurable interest
is requisite to the validity of the policy taken out here. Anyone who, for
his own benefit, procures a policy of insurance on the life of another must
have an insurable interest in that life.4 If no insurable interest exists, the
policy is "void" as a mere gaming contract, or as tending to induce the
insured to terminate the life.5
In the principal case, however, the policy was ostensibly taken out by
Nelleson himself and it was he who named the corporation as beneficiary.
Since it is the general rule that when the insured takes out the policy
on his own life he can designate anyone as beneficiary without regard to the
'There is no discussion in the case on whether or not this is a proper use of the
corporation's funds. In Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Board, Armstrong and Co.,
Corp., 115 Va. 836, 80 S. E. 565 (1914) such use was held intra vires. But see Victor
v. Louise Cotton Mills, 148 N. C. 107, 61 S. E. 648 (1908). See also Notes (1908)
16 L. R. A. (N.s.) 1020; (1913) 12 MicH. L. RZv. 607.2Colgrove v. Lowe, 343 Ii. 360, 175 N. E. 569 (1931), quoting Warnock v. Davis,
104 U. S. 775, 26 L. ed. 924 (1881); Baker v. Keet-Rountree Dry Goods Co., 318 Mo.
969, 2 S. W. (2d) 733 (1927) ; Ip- re Gibbons' Estate, 331 Pa. 36, 200 Atl. 55 (1938).
VANCE INSURANcE (2d ed. 1934) § 154.
aState v. Willett, 171 Ind. 296, 86 N. E. 68 (1908).4Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775, 26 L. ed. 924 (1881); Hawley v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 291 I1. 28, 125 N. E. 707 (1920) ; see VANcF, loc. cit. mtpra note 2. This point
is so well settled that extended citation of cases is unnecessary. For a compilation,
see 37 C. J. § 51, p. 385.5See cases cited supra note 4 and Patterson, Inirable Interest in Life (1918) 18
CoL. L. Rsv. 381. The court, in the principal case, did not refer to IkL. REv. STAT.
(1937) c. 38, § 332, which says: "Nothing contained in sections 131 and 13Z above
[referring to gaming contracts generally] shall be construed as to prohibit or in
any way affect any insurance made in good faith, for the security or indemnity of
the party insured, and which is not otherwise prohibited by law." A note in (1939)
4 Jo Hi MARSIuALL L. Q. 405 says that public policy would, in spite of the statute,
defeat those insurance contracts not supported by an insurable interest. Quaere: could
the words "for the security or indemnity" be interpreted as preserving the requirement
of insurable interest?
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question of insurable interest, 6 it might be argued that insurable interest was
no factor in this case. But the matter is not so simple as this, since the
policy was taken out by Nelleson as part of a contractual obligation with
the named beneficiary, and, more important, all premiums were paid by the
latter. Although the payment of premiums is not conclusive,7 it has beer
regarded as an important indication of who really procured the insurance;
therefore, this court had ample reason for requiring an insuable interest to
support the policy.8
Conceding, then, that the insurable interest question properly arose, the
case is on firm ground in holding there was such interest. By the great
weight of authority a corporation has a sufficient pecuniary interest in the
continued existence of a "key" man to support a policy taken out on his
lifeY The term "'key' man" is inclusive of officers,' 0 directors or large
stockholders," and general managers.' 2 It covers any person that is really
necessary to the successful operation of the corporation.' 3 In the principal
case, Nelleson was a director, the superintendent of the shop, and an expert
in the use of an essential process, so there seems to be little room for doubt
that he was properly placed in the "key" category.
But, assuming now that there was an insurable interest, what was its
extent? It was conceded that there was an insurable interest of $15,000
arising out of the contractual liability maturing at Nelleson's death. The
6Afro-American Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 195 Ala. 147, 70 So. 119 (1915); Reed v.
Provident Say. L. Assur. Soc., 190 N. Y. 111, 82 N. E. 734 (1907) ; Moore v. Pruden-
tial Casualty Co., 170 App. Div. 849, 156 N. Y. Supp. 892 (3d Dep't 1916), appeal
dinmssed, 220 N. Y. 568, 115 N. E. 1033 (1917).7Burdette v. Columbus Mut. Life Ins. Co., 80 W. Va. 384, 93 S. E. 366 (1917)
(emphasizing the element of good faith) ; Monast v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 32
R. I. 557, 79 Atl. 932 (1911).8Cases upholding policy where person insured paid premiums: Wohlberg v. Mer-
chant's Reserve Life Ins. Co., 209 Ill. App. 176 (1917) ; Rupp v. Western Life Indemnity
Co., 138 Ky. 18, 127 S. W. 490 (1910); King v. Cram, 185 Mass. 103, 69 N. E.
1049 (1904).
Cases defeating policy where person other than insured paid premiums: Dresen v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 195 II. App. 292 (1915) ; Cesna v. Sheibley, 88 Ill. App.
385 (1899) ; Reynolds v. Prudential Ins. Co., 88 Mo. App. 679 (1901); Herton v. Mut.
Reserve Fund Life Assoc., 135 N. C. 314, 47 S. E. 474 (1904); Ruth v. Ketterman,
112 Pa. 251, 3 A. 833 (1886).
9U. S. v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Corp., 265 U. S. 189, 195, 44 Sup. Ct. 546
(1924) ; Wellhouse v. United Paper Co., 29 F. (2d) 886 (C. C. A. 5th 1929) ; Keckley
v. Coshocton Glass Co., 86 Ohio St. 213, 99 N. E. 299 (1912); Murray v. G. F. Higgins
Co., 300 Pa. 341, 150 Atl. 629, 75 A. L. R. 1360, 1362 (1930); Wurzberg v. N. Y. Life
Ins. Co., 140 Tenn. 57, 203 S. W. 332 (1918) ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Board,
Armstrong and Co., 115 Va. 836, 80 S. E. 565 (1914).
IOu. S. v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Corp., 265 U. S. 189, 44 Sup. Ct. 546 (1924);
Murray v. G. F. Higgins Co., 300 Pa. 341, 150 Atl. 629 (1930); Mutual Life Ins.
Co. of N. Y. v. Board, Armstrong and Co., Corp., 115 Va. 836, 80 S. E. 565 (1914).
"lWellhouse v. United Paper Co., 29 F. (2d) 886 (C. C. A. 5th 1929); Keckley
v. Coshocton Glass Co., 86 Ohio St. 213, 99 N. E. 299 (1912). But in each case, in
addition to being a director or large stockholder, the person insured also had a
special function in the corporation. It seems that this factor is also required for
the existence of an insurable interest. Schott v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 19 Ohio
Dec. 249 (1908), aff'd. 30 Oh. C. C. 656, (1908).
12Wurzberg v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 140 Tenn. 57, 203 S. W. 332 (1918).
13Thus, the corporation has no insurable interest in the life of an ordinary employee.
Turner v. Davidson, 188 Ga. 736, 4 S. E. (2d) 814 (1939).
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executrix naturally argued that this was the limit of interest and it could
be said that the members themselves had fixed this limit.14 But this sum
did not cover Nelleson's value to the corporation as an integral part of
its profitable existence. The question, then, was whether his services to the
firm were worth $10,000, thus giving it an insurable interest to that amount.
Since the corporation was making a profit of from two to four times that
sum each year, $10,000 seemed to the court not an unreasonable estimate
of the loss to the corporation by his sudden death.15 The main criterion as
to the relation between the amount of the policy and the extent of the insurable
interest is whether the court feels the former was fixed in good faith or
was a mere wager on the life insured.16
In the principal case, the oral agreement justifies the outcome.17 What,
though, would be the result if there were no such agreement? It might
then be argued that the corporation intended to contract for only the
$15,000 stipulated in the written agreement among the members and that
it should get no more. On the other hand, since the premiums were un-
doubtedly higher due to the inclusion of the double liability clause, and since
there was an insurable interest in the $10,000 excess, it could be said that
the court should not speculate as to the intent of the parties and should
allow the surviving members a full recovery. The slight emphasis of this
Illinois court on the oral agreement and the great stress on the presence
of an insurable interest in the total amount may indicate that it would adopt
the latter view even in the absence of the oral agreement and would keep
the $10,000 windfall out of the hands of the deceased member's repre-
sentative.' s
14There was evidence that the three members had actually given thought to the
possibility of a sudden death as a greater disaster to them than mere death, and
therefore agreed that a double indemnity clause be included in the policy. See infra
note 17.
'
5 The fact that the 'death was by accident is, of course, not in itself important.
The significance of an accidental death fies in its sudden nature and it is' in this
respect that it causes a loss to the corporation.
'6Bevin v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 23 Conn. 244 (1854); Rittler v. Smith, 70 Md.
261, 16 Atl. 890 (1889) ; Reed v. Provident Say. L. Assur. Soc., 190 N. Y. 111, 82 N. E.
734 (1907) (all upholding the policy even though the face value was greater than
the insurable interest). But see Cammack v. Lewis, 15 Wall. 643, 21 L. ed. 244 (U.
S. 1872); Amick v. Butler, 111 Ind. 578, 12 N. E. 518 (1887) ; Mowry v. Home Life
Ins. Co., 9 R. I. 346 (1869) (cases holding that the discrepancy may be so great
as to evidence a mere wager contract).17The court admitted the oral agreement here on the theory that it supplemented
the written contract. Crawford v. France, 219 Cal. 439, 27 P. (2d) 645 (1934) ; Charles
Mulvey Mfg. Co. v. McKinney, 184 Ill. App. 476 (1914); Kirk v. First Nat. Bank,
132 Kans. 404, 295 Pac. 703 (1931); but cf. Beechwood Gun Club v. City of Beacon,
153 Misc. 358, 275 N. Y. Supp. 249 (Sup. Ct. 1934), af'd, 242 App. Div. 761, 275
N. Y. Supp. 219 (3d Dep't 1934), which held that the court should exclude extrinsic
evidence of terms of a contract that the parties might have inserted but didn't.
However, this note is not concerned with the construction or application of the parol
evidence rule and so the finding of the court that the evidence was admissable is taken as
conclusive for the purposes of this discussion.
'18The statement of facts in the main case says that this business was run much like
a partnership. It is probable that even if this were a partnership with the same
set-up, the result would be the same, inasmuch as the weight of authority holds that
a partner or partnership has an insurable interest in the life of the partners. Atkins
v. Cotter, 145 Ark. 326, 224 S. W. 624 (1920); Rahders v. People's Bank, 113 Minn.
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Had it been held that the corporation had no insurable interest in the
life of the decedent and the policy declared "void," a claim on behalf of his
estate might be put forth successfully. The normal result in cases where
the policy is declared "void" is to return the premiums if, but only if, the
person who paid the premiums acted in good faith.19 Where, however, the
interests of life insurance beneficiaries or estate claimants enter, there are
three distinct bodies of cases, the first of which seems irreconcilable with the
latter two. First, there are decisions which hold that the defense of lack of
insurable interest is available only to the insurer and that when the insurer
pays the beneficiary or pays the amount into court, no one can raise the
objection.20  If the principal case followed these, payment by the insurer
to the corporation would be conclusive and the estate could not claim the
proceeds. The second class of cases holds that where the beneficiary who
has been paid by the insurer without objection has, in fact, no insurable
interest, the beneficiary will hold the amount it received as trustee for the
estate of the person whose life was insured.2 1 A third group holds that
where a creditor insures the life of his debtor for an amount greater than
the debt, and the early death of the debtor provides a windfall, the excess
after the debt, premiums, and interest are paid to the creditor goes to the
estate of the debtor.22  The principle embodied in this third rule was no
doubt the inspiration for the suit of the executrix in the main case. She
hoped that the estate could collect the $10,000 as an excess over the insurable
interest just as in the debtor-creditor cases.23
496, 130 N. W. 16 (1911) ; Quinn v. Leidinger, 107 N. J. Eq. 188, 152 Atl. 299 (1930);
but cf. Sun Life Assur. Co. v. Allen, 270 Mich. 272, 259 N. W. 281 (1935) (mere
existence of a partnership did not give rise to an insurable interest in the life of a
partner; therefore there could be no recovery on the life of nominal partner who was
taken in merely to avoid labor trouble).
19Metrop. Life Ins. Co. v. Blesch, 22 Ky. L. R. 530, 58 S. W. 436 (1900); O'Connor
Transportation Co. v. Glens Falls Life Ins. Co., 204 App. Div. 56, 197 N. Y. Supp.
549 (4th Dep't 1922). In American Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bertram, 163 Ind. 51,
56, 70 N. E. 258 (1904), the court said: ". . . but it is held that this rule [speaking
of the general rule that will not allow recovery on an illegal policy] does not apply
. . . where it is clear that the policy was not a wagering contract, but was taken
out under a mistake in regard to the rights of the party insured." The litigation here
is typical of many other "windfall" situations arising out of excess or "void" insurance.20Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U. S. 149, 155, 32 Sup. Ct. 58 (1911) ; Chicago Title and
Trust Co. v. Haxton, 129 Ill. App. 626 (1906); Groff v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 92 Ill.
App. 207 (1900) ; Mechanics Nat'l Bank v. Comins, 72 N. H. 12, 55 Atl. 191 (1903) ;
Keckley v. Coshocton Glass Co., 86 Ohio St. 213, 99 N. E. 299 (1912). The factual
situation in this last case is almost the same as in the main case and the same result
is reached as to the presence of an insurable interest.21Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Blodgett, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 45, 48, 27 S. W. 286 (1894).
VANCE, INSURANCE (Zd ed. 1934) 183 n. says the doctrine is peculiar to Texas, but
it seems to have been adopted in several other jurisdictions. Warnock v. Davis, 104
U. S. 775, 26 L. ed. 924 (1881) ; Exchange Bank of Macon v. Loh, Adm'r, 104 Ga. 446,
459, 31 S. E. 459 (1898) ; Lanouette v. La Plante, 67 N. H. 118, 36 Atl. 981 (1891).22Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775, 26 L. ed. 924 (1881) ; Strode v. Drug Co., 101
Mo. App. 627, 74 S. W. 379 (1903); Goldbaum v. Blum, 79 Tex. 638, 15 S. W. 564(1891). But see Central Nat'l Bank v. Hume, 128 U. S. 195, 9 Sup. Ct. 41 (1888) ;
Rittler v. Smith, 70 Md. 261, 16 At. 890 (1889); Dalby v. India Life Assur. Co., 15
C. B. 365 (1854) (cases holding creditor can retain entire amount, even if the debt
is paid before the death of the party Whose life was insured).2 31t must be remembered, of course, that this is a discussion of what the court
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Despite this anomaly in cases where it is held that there is no insurable
interest, the finding of the principal case that there was an insurable interest
is in accord with the great weight of authority.24
Jerome S. Affron
Judicial notice of laws of sister states in New York: Pleading and proof:
Appellate review: Scope: Proposed uniform judicial notice of foreign law
act.-Plaintiff bondholders sought to enforce a guaranty against the
defendant. Both the principal obligation of the bonds and the guaranty were
executed in Pennsylvania and were to be performed in that state. Defenses:
(1) the guaranty ran to the "registered owner" of the bonds, and plaintiffs
failed to allege or prove such ownership, and (2) under a statute and the
common law of Pennsylvania relating to the doctrine of exoneration of a
guarantor, defendant had a complete defense. Both issues were controverted.
On cross motions for summary judgment, the court below granted plain-
tiffs' motion, ruling that the defendant's answer failed to raise a substantial
issue of fact. In reversing this judgment, the New York Court of Appeals
held, in Read et al. v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, 284 N. Y. 435, 31
N. E. (2d) 891 (1941)1: (1) inasmuch as plaintiffs failed to plead or prove
the law of Pennsylvania bearing on the language of the principal obligation
or the guaranty, the court presumes that the law of the foreign jurisdiction
accords with the law of New York, and under the New York law a triable
issue of fact as to the ownership of the bonds was raised by the defendant's
answer; (2) by pleading the Pennsylvania statute and the common law of
exoneration, defendant raised a second issue of fact, for "the question of
what is the law of a foreign jurisdiction is one of fact. It '... must be
proved as facts are proven'. " 2
Although the statement of Lord Mansfield in Mostyn v. FabrigaS,3 repeated
by Chief Justice Marshall in Church v. Hubbard,4 and adopted in New York
might do if it found no insurable interest or a policy in excess of the insurable interest,
a result which the court did not reach in the principal case.2 4 See cases cited supra note 9.
The court said in the main case: "If within the meaning of the law, the defendant
had an insurable interest on that date [date the policy was taken out], then the fact
that at a later date the interest ceased would not invalidate the policy." Numerous
cases, including Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U. S. 149, 32 Sup. Ct. 58 (1911) ; Wellhouse
v. United Paper Co., 29 F. (2d) 886 (C. C. A. 5th 1929); and Keckley v. Coshocton
Glass Co., 86 Ohio St. 213, 99 N. E. 299 (1912), were cited in support of this propo-
sition. The statement of the court is evidently by way of dictum as there is nothing
in the facts to indicate that the association between the decedent and the corporation
terminated before his death. Nevertheless, the statement is in accord with the general
rule, as a life insurance policy has come to be regarded not as a contract of in-
demnity, but a contract to pay a certain sum of money on the death of the person
whose life was insured; the only requirement is that there be an insurable interest at
the date the policy is procured. See Dalby v. India Life Assur. Co., 15 C. B. 365
(1854). A good note on this topic is to be found in Ann. Cas. 1913D 607.
'Rev'g 258 App. Div. 948, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 99 (1st Dep't 1940).
2284 N. Y. 435, 444, 31 N. E. (2d) 891 (1941).
31 Cowp. 160, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K. B. 1774).
42 Cranch 187, 236, 237, 2 L ed. 249 (U. S. 1804).
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by Chief Justice Kent in Thompson v. Ketchum, 5 to the effect that foreign
law is a fact to be proved, has been loudly criticized and continually con-
demned by legal scholars, it remains the law of New York today. New Yrk
courts cannot take judicial notice of the laws of another state; they must
be proved as facts are proved.6 In the absence of such proof the law of the
foreign state is conclusively presumed to be the same as the common law
of New York.7 In so holding, New York is in substantial accord with the
weight of American authority.8
The degree of particularity with which foreign law must be pleaded has
caused no little difficulty in many jurisdictions. Thus it has been held that
mere reference to a foreign statute by title and date of enactment is insuffi-
cient ;9 that where foreign statutes are relied on the pertinent sections must
be pleaded verbatim.' 0 New York, however, with the majority view," is
more lenient. Any pleading of the substance and effect of the foreign law
as found in statutes and judicial opinions is sufficient if it enables the court
to determine the meaning and effect of the foreign law.' 2
58 Johns. 189 (N. Y. 1811).6Cherwein v. Geiter, 272 N. Y. 165, 5 N. E. (2d) 185 (1936); Italiano v. Rosen-
baum, 246 App. Div. 687, 284 N. Y. Supp. 177 (1st Dep't 1935), aff'd on other grounds
271 N. Y. 583, 3 N. E. (2d) 196 (1936) (memo.); Daugherty v. Equitable Life Assur-
ance Society, 266 N. Y. 71, 193 N. 5. 897 (1934) ; People v. Daiboch, 265 N. Y. 125,
191 N. E. 859 (1934); Petrogradsky M. K. Bank v. Nat'l City Bank, 253 N. Y. 23,
170 N. E. 479 (1930) ; Fitzpatrick v. International Ry., 252 N. Y. 127, 169 N. E. 112
(1929); International Textbook Co. v. Connelly, 206 N. Y. 188, 99 N. E. 188 (1912),
and cases cited therein at page 201; Southworth' v. Morgan, 205 N. Y. 293, 98 N. E.
490 (1912); Hanna v. Lichtenhein, 182 App. Div. 94, 169 N. Y. Supp. 589 (1st Dep't
1918), rev'd on other grounds, 225 N. Y. 579, 122 N. E. 625 (1919); Bank of China
v. Morse, 168 N. Y. 458, 61 N. E. 774 (1901) ; Harris v. White, 81 N. Y. 532 (1880) ;
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Church, 59 How. Prac. 293, 81 N. Y. 218 (1880) ; Hull v. Mitche-
son, 64 N. Y. 639 (1876) ; Monroe v. Douglas, 5 N. Y. 447 (1851).
7See cases supra note 6, particularly International Textbook Co. v. Connelly and
Southworth v. Morgan.
815 R. C. L. 1071; Note (1925) 34 A. L. R. 1444.
9Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Barton, 14 Ga. App. 160, 162, 80 S. E. 530 (1914);
McDonald v. Bankers Life Assoc., 154 Mo. 618, 55 S. W. 999 (1899) ; State Nat'l Bank
v. Levy, 141 Mo. App. 288, 125 S. W. 542 (1910).
'
0 Grand Lodge, B. R. T. v. Clark, 189 Ind. 373, 127 N. E. 280 (1920), 18 A. L. R.
1190, 1197 (1922); Milligan v. State, 86 Ind. 553 (1882); Tyler v. Kent, 52 Ind. 5-83
(1876); Wilson v. Clark, 11 Ind. 385 (1856) ; Bank of Commerce v. Fugua, 11 Mont.
285, 28 Pac. 291 (1891); Lipsett v. Dettering, 94 Wash. 629, 162 Pac. 1007 (1917);
Lowry v. More, 16 Wash. 476, 48 Pac. 238 (1897).
"Forsyth v. Preer, 62 Ala. 443 (1878) ; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Haist, 71 Ark.
258, 72 S. W. 893 (1903); Louisville N. A. & C. R.R. v. Shires, 108 Ill. 617 (1884);
Bean v. Briggs, 4 Iowa 464 (1857.); Showalter v. Rickert, 64 Kan. 82, 67 Pac. 454
(1902) ; Montgomery v. Consol. Boat Store Co., 115 Ky. 156, 72 S. W. 816 (1903);
Moe v. Shaffer, 150 Minn. 114, 184 N. W. 785 (1921), 18 A. L. R. 1194, 1197 (1922) ;
Bondurant v. Brotherhood, 199 S. W. 424 (Mo. App. 1917); Salt Lake Nat'l Bank
v. Hendrickson, 40 N. J. L. 52 (1878); Los Angeles Investment Securities Corp. v.
Joslyn, 258 App. Div. 762, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 798 (3d Dep't 1939); Wellman v. Me.d,
93 Vt. 322, 107 Atl. 396 (1919).
12Sultan of Turkey v. Tiryakian, 213 N. Y. 929, 108 N. E. 72 (1915), aff'g 162 App.
Div. 613, 147 N. Y. Supp. 978 (1st Dep't 1914); Rothschild v. Rio Grande Western
R.R., 26 Abb. N. C. 312 (N. Y. 1890); Schluter v. Bowery Say. Bank, 117 N. Y. 125,
22 N. E. 572 (1889); Swing v. Wanamaker, 139 App. Div. 627, 124 N. Y. Supp. 231
(1st Dep't 1910); Caras v. Thalman, 138 App. Div. 297, 123 N. Y. Supp. 97 (1st Dep't
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Proof of foreign law may be made by printed copies of the written laws,
or by oral testimony as to the unwritten law of the foreign state.:13 The proof,
by Section 391 of the Civil Practice Act, is to be made to the court, and
the court is to determine the foreign law put in issue. In so doing, the court
is not limited to a consideration of the evidence submitted, but may consult
any of the written authorities that would be competent in evidence under
the statute.
No substantial conflict exists as to the general law of the state in the above
respects. A further question, smacking of academic syllogism but actually
of considerable pragmatic importance, is, however, the subject of divided
opinion in the lower courts of New York. Is the court, in determining the
foreign law in accordance with Section 391, determining a question of fact
or a question of law ?14
In the leading case of Bank of China v. Morse,15 in 1901, Judge Martin
emphatically declared that the court decided a question of law, and this view
received endorsement by Judge Crane in the equally famous case of Fitz-
patrick v. International Railway Company. 6 Yet the court, in the principal
case, held, as did the Appellate Division of the Third Department, in the
recent case of Los Angeles Investment Securities Corporation v. JoslyQ, 7
1910) ; Congregational Unitarian Soc. v. Hale, 29 App. Div. 396, 51 N. Y. Supp. 7P4
(1st Dep't 1898); O'Reilly, S. & F. Co. v. Greene, 18 Misc. 423, 41 N. Y. Supp. 1056
(Sup. Ct. 1896) ; Berney v. Drexel, 33 Hun 34 (Sup. Ct. 1884). See also Holmes v.
Broughton, 10 Wend. 75 (N. Y. 1833); Colcord v. Banco de Tamaulipas, 181 App. Div.
295, 168 N. Y. Supp. 710 (1st Dep't 1917).
13N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 391. Copies of laws or decisions published with authorization
of the state concerned are presumptive evidence of the existence of the law therein
expounded.
"Section 391 of the Civil Practice Act, relating to statutes, decrees and decisions of
another state or country, has not changed the law. That section refers to additional
evidence and not to a case where no evidence was produced and where the case was
not tried on the theory that the foreign law was different from our own." Cherwein v.
Geiter, 272 N. Y. 165, 168, 5 N. E. (2d) 185 (1936).
14Pertinent questions depending on the answer to this question are: If a foreign court
changes the controlling rule of law of that state after the verdict and judgment in a
New York action depending on that rule, should counsel move for a new trial on the
basis of newly discovered evidence, or appeal to the Appellate Division to reverse on
the law? Should the Appellate Division, in passing on the determination by the trialjustice of the foreign law, affirm or reverse on the facts, or on the law? If the foreign
law alone is at issue, can an appeal be taken to the Court of Appeals under any circum-
stances if the Appellate Division affirms the trial court? See Los Angeles Investment
Securities Corp. v. Joslyn, infra note 17.
15168 N. Y. 458, 61 N. E. 774 (1901).
16252 N. Y. 127, 136, 138, 169 N. E. 112 (1929), 68 A. L. R. 801, 809 (1930).
'1158 Misc. 164, 284 N. Y. Supp. 36 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 254 App. Div. 711, 4 N. Y.
S. (2d) 140 (3d Dep't 1939), aff'd w.o. op., 279 N. Y. 734, 18 N. E. (2d) 684 (1939),
rehearing denied, 280 N. Y. 570, 20 N. E. (2d) 19. (1939), new trial granted, 12 N. Y.
S. (2d) 370 (Sup. Ct. 1939), rev'd, 258 App. Div. 762, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 798 (1939),
inotion to resettle decision denied, 258 App. Div. 821, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 175 (1939),
motion granted, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 830, appeal granted, 282 N. Y. 592, 25 N. E. (2d)
146 (1939), appeal dismissed, 282 N. Y. 438, 26 N. E. (2d) 968 (1940). In this case a
California corporation sought to assess its New York shareholders, as allowed by Cali-
fornia law. Plaintiff pleaded foreign law and had verdict and judgment. During de-
fendant's appeals to the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals, two California
cases bearing on the point of law involved were decided. These were argued before
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed withouf opinion, and denied a motion to reargue.
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that the court determined a question of fact when it determined foreign law.
It is submitted that in so holding the court announced an undesirable rule.
The principal object of the rule that foreign law must be proved as facts
are proved is to prevent the adverse party's being surprised.' 8 While it was
true when the rule was laid down that such proof was necessary to inform
the court of the foreign law, that is no longer true today.' 9 As a matter of
convenience it may be sound practice for the courts to require counsel to
seek out foreign law for the court's perusal, but that convenience, and fear
of unfair tactics, should not convert foreign law into "facts" in legal con-
notation, when so to do is to deprive litigants of the right of appeal to the
highest court of the state.2 0 The doctrine that foreign law is a fact is a legal
fiction, and should be used, if at all, only where necessary to enable the court
to reach a just result.
The New York Legislature will have for its consideration at the next ses-
sion a bill embodying the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act.
This act, adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 1936, was drafted by Professor Wigmore and others to put
to rest for all time the archaic fiction discussed above. Twelve states have
thus far adopted the Act.21 The primary purpose of the Act is that the law
of sister states be handled in courts of justice in the United States in the
same manner that the lex fori is handled. In this day and age, when both
courts and parties may refer to fifty-two official reporter systems; several
competent private reporter systems; published statutory law, both official and
private; innumerable law reviews, case digests, case annotations, and clearing
house services of all descriptions, to discover the law of sister states, the
result sought to be attained is to be commended. The courts and the legis-
lature might well take notice of the fact that communications and publications
have forged ahead since 1774.22
It may well be considered, however, whether enactment of the Uniform
Law would in ,fact contribute to the solving of New York's problems, or
whether Section 391 as presently construed is adequate.
Defendant then moved in the trial court for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered
evidence, and the motion wag granted. The Appellate Division reversed the order, and
the Court of Appeals refused to review that decision.
'sSee Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Comp. 160, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K. B. 1774).
19An interesting passage is to be found in In re Cummins' Estate, 142 App. Div. 377,
387, 127 N. Y. Supp. 109 (1st Dep't 1911), where Judge Miller says: "A little industry
would have enabled the representative of the Comptroller in this case to show that. .... "
Judge Miller then cites the controlling California law completely before adding, "Of
course, we cannot take judicial notice of the statutes and decisions above cited. I refer
to them only to show what might have been proven, if in the limited time which I have
been able to give the subject I have discovered and correctly discerned what the law of
California is."20See N. Y. CONsT. Art. 6, § 6.21 llinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Dakota. See 9 U. L. A. 1940 Supp., 105-108;
Hallen, The Uniform Evidence Acts (1939) 6 OHIO ST. L. J. 25.22HIcKs, LEGAL REsEARcH (2d ed. 1933) 92 et seq. points out that at the time of
the Revolution there were no law reports published in the United States. Kirby's Con-
necticut reports were the first regularly printed, and were published in 1789. Not until
after the turn of the century did state reports become general, and the first well organized
series of unofficial reports-the American Reports-was inaugurated in 1871.
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Section 1 of the Uniform Act provides: "Every court of this state shall
take judicial notice of the common law and statutes of every state, territory
or other jurisdiction of the United States." That section is substantially
similar to a Massachusetts statute enacted to abrogate the common law rule,
which statute was held, by judicial decision, to effect no change in the com-
mon law rule.23 Other courts, interpreting such statutes, have split on the
question whether "shall" should be construed to mean "may" or "must."
24
It has been suggested that the better view is that the Act leaves the question
of judicial notice to the discretion of the trial court.2 5
Section 3 of the Act provides: "The determination of such laws shall be
made by the court and not by the jury, and shall be reviewable." Section 391
of the Civil Practice Act provides essentially the same rule: "The law of
such state or territory . .. is to be determined by the court or referee or
charged to the jury, as the case may be. Such finding or charge is subject
to review on appeal." Because of this similarity, serious doubt may be
entertained whether the enactment of the Uniform Act would change the
New York rule on appellate review of a determination of foreign law. It
should be noted, however, that the above provision of Section 391 follows a
detailed statement of the old common law rule that the law of a foreign state
may be "proved as a fact." The enactment of the Uniform Act might, there-
fore, be construed an expression of legislative intent to bring New York
to the fore in modernizing its rules of evidence and procedure in the respect
suggested by Professor Wigmore, i.e., considering foreign law as law, and
the determination thereof by the court as a determination of law.
Recent pronouncements of the Court of Appeals point to a future holding
that Section 391 authorizes the courts to take judicial notice of foreign laws
in proper cases.26 Such a construction of the statute would be strained, and
would necessitate a reversal of several prior decisions on the general matter.27
If judicial notice is to be declared, it would seem that a legislative pronounce-
2 3 MAss. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 233, § 70: "The courts shall take judicial notice of
the law of the United States or of any state, territory, or dependency thereof or of a
foreign country whenever the same shall be material." Cases holding that this statute did
not charge the common law rule: Lennon v. Cohen, 264 Mass. 414, 163 N. E. 63 (1928),
noted (1928) 8 B. U. L. REV. 307; Seeman v. Encix, 272 Mass. 189, 172 N. E. 243(1930).24In J. R. Watkins Medical Co. v. Johnson, 129 Ark. 384, 388, 196 S. W. 465 (1917),
the court said the Arkansas statute reading "the courts of this state shall take judicial
notice of the laws of sister states," meant "required to take notice of these laws." Cali-
fornia, in Barnaby v. Barnaby, 100 Cal. App. 195, 200, 279 Pac. 1064 (1929), said "shall
meant "allowed," while Wisconsin, in Owen v. Owen, 178 Wisc. 609, 611, 190 N. W. 363
(1922), said, under a "shall" statute, "We are required by the statutes of this state to
take judicial notice of the public laws of any state."25See Notes (1930) 10 B. U. L. REV. 417; (1928) 42 HRV. L. REv. 130; (1932) 30
MIcH. L. Ray. 747, 765; (1929) 14 ST. Louis L. Rav. 444; (1928) 13 ST. Louis L. Rv.
151; (1928) 14 VA. L. Ray. 594.26Los Angeles Investment Securities Corp. v. Joslyn, 282 N. Y. 438, 441, 26 N. E.
(2d) 968 (1940) ; People ex rel. Higley v. Millspaw, 281 N. Y. 441, 445, 24 N. E. (2d)
117 (1939).27See cases cited at note 6 supra.
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ment of this result would be preferable. 28
Real Property: Creation of tenancies by the entirety: The unities.-
Tenancies by the entirety have behind them a long period of litigation,'
but problems concerning their creation still arise. The difficulty springs
fundamentally from the fact that, as in the case of joint tenancies, the
requirements of the four unities of time, title, interest and possession must
be satisfied; the estate of each owner must commence at the same time; their
interests must accrue by the same instrument; their interests must be equal;
and they must hold by one and the same undivided possession.2 In addi-
tion to these four unities, a fifth unity peculiar to tenancies by the entirety
is also essential. This is the unity of person arising from the common law
conception of husband and wife as one.3
It frequently happens that one spouse owns land individually but desires
28The pertinent parts of Section 391, and the corresponding provisions of the Uniform
Act are:
Section 391 N. Y. Civ. Ppac. AcT
A printed copy of a statute, or other Sectiol
written law, of another state . . . terri- any adn
tory, or of a foreign country, or a copy but . . .
of a proclamation, edict, decree or ordi- to the ad
nance . . . contained in a book or publi- otherwist
cation . . . published by the authority
thereof . . . is presumptive evidence of Sectio
the statute, law, proclamation, edict, de- shall tak
cree or ordinance, law and'
The unwritten or common law of an- or other
other state, or territory, or of a foreign Sectio
country, may be proved as a fact by oral other tha
evidence. The books of reports of cases shall be
. . must also be admitted as presumptive not be s
evidence of the unwritten or common law
thereof. Sectio,
The [foreign] law is to be determined laws sha:
by the court or referee, or charged to the by the ji
jury . . . subject to review on appeal.
In determining such law, neither the trial Sectior
court, nor any appellate court shall be self of s
limited to the evidence produced on the may dee
trial by the parties, but may consult any call on c
or the written authorities named in this informati
section. (Other
repeal of
uniformit
'They were litigated as early as the 13th century.
Rolls in Parl. 66, 19 Edw. I (1291).2Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N. Y. 306, 39 N. E. 357 (1895).
3lbid.
UNIFORm AcT
z 4: Any party may also present
nissible evidence of such laws,
reasonable notice shall be given
[verse parties on the pleadings or
e.
z. I: Every Court of this state
e judicial notice of the common
statutes of every state, territory,
jurisdiction of the United States.
p 5: The law of a jurisdiction
an those referred to in Section 1
an issue for the court, but shall
ubject to . . . judicial notice.
3: The determination of such
I be made by the court and not
ury, and shall be reviewable.
2: The court shall inform it-
uch laws in such manner as it
im proper, and the court may
ounsel to aid it in obtaining such
on.
* sections of the act provide for
inconsistent statutes, and for
y of interpretation.)
Case of Margery de Mose, 1
Stanley M. Brown
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to hold it as a tenant by the entirety with the other spouse. How is he to
accomplish his purpose? His problem is complicated by the fact that, not
only must he satisfy the five unities, but also he must cope with two other
doctrines of the common law: (1) a husband cannot convey to his wife ;4
and (2) a grantor cannot, convey to himseff 5  The difficulty in conveying
to one's wife has now been ameliorated by statutes which specifically sanc-
tion such dealings; but the second obstacle is still a formidable one. The
problem might easily be resolved by declaring that the grantor is conveying
an interest to his spouse while retaining in himself an interest sufficient
to create the desired form of co-ownership. It seems that, speaking real-
istically, this is what happens, but in this situation reality does not furnish
the solution, for then the interests of the husband and of the wife cannot
be said to accrue at the same time nor by the same instrument, and two of
the five unities necessary for the creation of a tenancy by the entirety are
lacking. The courts reach the result that a tenancy by the entirety is not
created whether the grantor attempts to convey merely a half interest to
his spouse,8 or whether the grant runs from the grantor to himself and his
spouse.7  Therefore the orthodox method of effecting the metamorphosis
has been for the grantor to convey the land to' a third person who in turn
deeds it over to the husband and wife as joint grantees.
In Pennsylvania, however, the Uniform Interparty Agreement Act pro-
vides "a conveyance, release, or sale, may be made to, or by, two or more
persons acting jointly, and one or more, but less than all of these persons,
acting either by himself or themselves, or with other persons, and a contract
may be made between such parties."8  In re Estate of Mary VandergriftO
the court held that this statute made it possible for a wife to create a tenancy
by the entirety by conveying to herself and her husband. Since the decision
makes no mention of the unities problem, the question arises as to whether
the court believed the unities to have been satisfied by the form of the
conveyance. It is difficult, however, to see how the court could reach such
a conclusion, for how can it be said that the interests of the husband
and the wife in the co-tenancy arise at the same time? It is true that
the New York courts, following Matter of Klatzl, 0 have held that a tenancy
by the entirety can be created by such aconveyance," but the Klatzl case
was based upon reasoning quite different from the reasoning in the Vander-
grift case and was not founded upon a statute. .In the Klatzl case, the
4McCord v. Bright, 44 Ind. App. 275 (1909).5Deslauriers v. Senesac, 331 Ill, 437, 163 N. E. 327 (1928); Green v. Connady, 77
S. C. 193, 57 S. E. 832 (1907). Where the grantor conveyed to himself and another,
courts had two alternatives after declaring that the conveyance to the grantor failed.
They could hold that a tenancy in common was created [Deslauriers v. Senesac, supra]
or they could hold that the grantee who was capable of taking took the entire fee.
Hicks v. Spankle, 149 Tenn. 310, 257 S. W. 1044 (1933).6De~lauriers v. Sepesac, supra note 5.7Pegg *. Pegg, 165 Wis. 228, 130 N. W. 617 (1911).
sp. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 69, § 541.
9105 Pa. Super. 293, 161 At. 898 (1932). See Note (1932) 18 CoRM LL LAW
QUARTERLY 284.
10216 N. Y. 83, 110 N. E. 181 (1915).
"lMatter of Horler, 180 App. Div. 608; 168 N. Y. Supp. 221 (1st Dep't 1917);
Matter of Farrand, 126 Misc. 590, 214 N. Y. Supp. 793 (Surr. Ct. 1926).
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grantor had deeded the land directly to himself and his wife declaring in
the instrument that he intended to create a tenancy by the entirety. The
precise problem before the court was whether a transfer tax could be collected
at the death of the grantor. Three of the judges thought that the deed
created a tenancy in common and that therefore the tax could" be imposed.
Chief Judge Bartlett concurred in the result, but he argued that a tenancy
by the entirety was created. The three dissenting judges also thought that
a tenancy by the entirety had been created, but they disagreed with the Chief
Judge on the tax point. Contending for the theory that a. tenancy by the
entirety had been created, Judge Bartlett argued that the grantor was not
conveying to himself since he and his wife constituted a distinct entity.
Furthermore, he said, the interests in the co-tenancy arise at the same time.
In Boehringer v. Schmic' 2 the Court of Appeals, in a per curianv opinion,
stated that the Klatzl case settled the New York rule, and that a husband;
by conveying to himself and his wife, can establish a tenancy by the entirety.
But, the reasoning in the Klatzl case seems inapplicable to the Vandergrift
case if the Pennsylvania statute is to be used, for it is illogical to say that
a husband and wife are an entity distinct from either of them for the purpose
of satisfying the unities, but are nevertheless separate 'persons within the
meaning of the statute. Indeed, the Supreme judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts, speaking through Chief Justice Rugg, recognized the logical hiatus
and reached the opposite conclusion that, since a tenancy by the entirety
is based upon the theory that a husband and wife are one, the grantor, in
attempting to create such a tenancy was not granting to himself "jointly
with another person" within the meaning of a similar statute. The court
held that a joint tenancy was created.' 3
Arguing from the Vandergrift case, then, it could have been contended
that the Pennsylvania courts had abandoned the theory of unities, but the
recent case of In re Walker, 16 A. (2d) 28 (Pa. 1941), disproves such a
conclusion. In that case, a husband conveyed an u.ndivided one-half interest
in the land to his wife. The deed set forth that the parties were husband and
wife and recited that the purpose of the conveyance "is to create an estate
by entireties to the real estate herein described." The court ruled, follow-
ing orthodox theory, that the conveyance created a tenancy in common and
not an estate by the entirety, since the husband's interest had vested earlier
than that of his wife and was created by a different instrument. Moreover
the interests of the co-tenants did not conform to the requirements of a
tenancy by the entirety since each held the whole of an undivided part
instead of an undivided part of the whole.
The result of the Vandergrift and Walker decisions is that the Penn-
sylvania law on the creation of tenancies by the entirety does not form an
harmonious whole. In no other jurisdiction are the unities passed over
in the one case and required in the other. States either reject both forms
of conveyances, or they accept both forms. A different approach to the
problem of the Walker case may be seen in the New York decision of Matter
12254 N. Y. 355, 173 N. E. 220 (1930), aff'g 133 Misc. 236, 232 N. Y. Supp. 360
(Sup. Ct. 1928).
13Ames v. Chandler, 265 Mass. 428, 164 N. E. 616 (1929). The court does not
discuss the unities problem, but there is no difficulty in saying that the interests in the
co-tenancy arise at the same time and by the same instrument.
1941]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
of Hdrler,14 where a wife conveyed to her husband by a deed containing
the following recital: "it being the intention of the party of the first part
to transfer and convey to the party of the second part an undivided one-half
interest and estate in the aforesaid parcel of land and improvements thereon
so that the party of the first part and the party of the second part shall hold
and own the same as joint tenants and not as tenants in common, and so
that the survivor shall have and take the absolute title and ownership in
and to the same in fee simple absolute." The court held that a joint
tenancy was created since "it is sufficient if there is an apt description of
the estate to be created and that such an interest is in law a joint tenancy."'15
Although it may well be questioned whether the entity concept is validly
employed in the creation of a joint tenancy since the technical difference
between a joint tenancy and a tenancy by the entirety is the difference be-
tween a holding by two persons as individual, though joint owners, and a
holding by two persons as a single owner,16 it is submitted that the Horler
decision reaches a correct result by overlooking technicalitiesL7 where they
serve no purpose other than to override a clearly expressed and lawful intent.
Louis Levene
Taxation: Income tax: Assignments of future income.-If the owner
of property transfers it to another, it is clear that he can no longer be taxed
on the income from the property. On the other hand,, if he merely assigns
his right to receive the income, retaining the property itself, it is almost as
clear that he should remain taxable on that income. At the border-line, where
the property out of which the income arises is intangible, or where it is
doubtful if there is any property, it becomes difficult to ascertain whether
the owner is merely assigning income or is transferring the income-bearing
property as well.
In Lucas v. Earl,' an attorney assigned to his wife one half of all the salary
and fees to be earned by him in given years.. The Supreme Court held that
he was taxable on the income when-paid. On the other hand, in Blair v.
Connissioer,2 it held that the beneficiary of a trust had relieved himself
of further taxation on the income by assigning his interest under the trust.
The Court reached this decision on the ground that he was the owner of an
equitable interest in the corpus of the trust, that this interest was present
14Supra note 11.
'
5 Under the principle of false den, onstratio iton nocet, it is entirely permissible to
ascertain the words which reveal the specific intent and to ignore inconsistent language.
9 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2476.
16It is commonly said that tenants by the entirety hold per tout et non per my (by
all and not by the half) while joint tenants hold per tout et per mny. See Green Y.
Connady, 77 S. C. 193, 57 S. E. 832 (1907).
17 The basis for the unities requirement is little discussed by modern courts. The
courts which apply the unities rule make no attempt to justify either its present or
past existence.
1281 U. S. 111, 50 Sup. Ct. 241 (1930).
2300 U. S. 5, 57 Sup. Ct. 330 (1937).
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property and alienable, and that he had transferred it by the assignment.
These decisions have been the basis of the oft-stated rule that the assignor
of future income remains taxable unless he has succeeded in transferring not
only the income but the income-bearing property itself.3
Several decisions have applied the principle enunciated in the Blair case
to assignments of trust income, freeing the assignors from taxation thereon.4
Courts have reached the same result even where the assignment was of a
part of the income only,5 or of the income for a specified year. 6 The doctrine
has its limitations, however. According to the Board of Tax Appeals, the
assignor remains taxable upon the income accruing before the date of assign-
ment.7 Furthermore, the assignor must put the income completely and
effectively out of his control.8 Thus he will not escape taxation if the trust
is spendthrift,9 or if the assignment of trust income is to fulfill a marital
obligation.10 A contract to make annual payments out of trust income"l or
to pay over such income as it is received 12 will not release the assignor from
taxation.
3 MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME (1936) 258 et seq.; Buck, Income Tax Evasion and Avoid-
ance: The Deflection of Income (1936) 23 VA. L. REv. 107, 123; Surrey, Assignments of
Income and Related Devices: Choice of the Taxable Person (1933) 33 COL. L. Rlv.
791, 796. See annotation (1933) 83 A. L. R. 88 to Hall v. Burnet, 54 F. (2d) 443 (App.
D. C. 1931); Note (1940) 53 HAgv. L. REv. 1398.
Illustrations of the application of such a rule are found in Ward v. Commissioner,
58 F. (Zd) 757 (C. C. A. 9th 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 656, 53 Sup. Ct. 118 (1932)
(assignment of rentals without assigning the lease; held, assignor still taxable); Bing
v. Bowers, 22 F. (2d) 450 (S. D. N. Y. 1927), aff'd, 26 F. (2d) 1017 (C. C. A. 2d 1928)
(assignment of share of rents and profits; held, assignor taxable as he retained the
realty) ; Commissioner v. Field, 42 F. (2d) 820 (C. C. A. 2d 1930) (existing interest
in property was assigned; held, assignor not taxable on income) ; Schoonmaker v. Com-
missioner, 39 B. T. A. 496 (1939) (bonds irrevocably transferred; held, assignor not
taxable on accrued but unmatured interest).4 Byrnes v. Commissioner, 110 F. (2d) 294 (C. C. A. 3d 1940) ; Commissioner v. Per-
kins, 104 F. (Zd) 686 (C. C. A. 1st 1939) ; Lowery v. Helvering, 70 F. (2d) 713 (C. C.
A. 2d 1934) ; Shellabarger v. Commissioner, 38 F. (2d) 566 (C. C. A. 1st 1930) ; Young
v. Gnichtel, 28 F. (2d), 789 (D. N. J. 1928) ; O'Malley-Keyes v. Eaton, 24 F. (2d)
436 (D. Conn. 1928); Gordon v. Commissioner, 39 B. T. A. 237 (1939); Whitcomb
v. Commissioner, 37 B. T. A. 806 (1938), aff'd, 103 F. (2d) 1009 (C. C. A. 6th 1939) ;
Booth v. Commissioner, 36 B. T. A. 141 (1937), aff'd; 103 F. (2d) 1008 (C. C. A. 6th
1939).
5 Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 5, 57 Sup. Ct. 330 (1937); Shanley v. Bowers,
81 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A. 2d 1936).
6 Schaffner v. Harrison, 113 F. (2d) 449 (C. C. A. 7th 1940), cert. granted, 61 Sup.
Ct. 134 (1940), Docket No. 437. Contra: Huber v. Helvering, 4 Prentice-Hall 1941
Fed. Tax Serv. II 62,411 (App. D. C. 1941).7 Marx v. Commissioner, 39 B. T. A. 537 (1939).
SCorliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376, 50 Sup. Ct. 336 (1929) ; Power v. Commissioner,
61 F. (2d) 625 (C. C. A. 8th 1932).
9King v. United States, 84 F. (2d) 156 (C. C. A. 1st 1936) ; Commissioner v. Blair,
60 F. (2d) 340 (C. C. A. 7th 1932).
'0Longyear v. Helvering, 77 F. (2d) 116 (App. D. C. 1935) ; McDonald v. Helvering,
74 F. (2d) 1005 (App. .D. C. 1934).
"lBrewster v. United States, 9 VF. Supp. 686 (Ct. Cl. 1935) ; Crawford v. Commissioner,
30 B. T. A. 832 (1934).
12Wood v. Commissioner, 74 F. (2d) 78 (C. C. A. 6th 1934) ; Porter v. United States,
52 F. (2d) 1056 (Ct. Cl. 1931).
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The Blair principle has been extended beyond trust income cases. The
assignor is not taxable when the income assigned arises under contracts call-
ing for royalties,' 3 since a royalty contract is considered to be property. In
one case an insurance agent was allowed to escape taxation by assigning his
right to future renewal commissions.' 4 The court reached this disputed 5
conclusion by calling the right to renewal commissions a property right, upon
the theory that they are already earned by past services of the agent. 16  But
an assignment of ordinary commissions and bonuses to be earned by future
services of the agent will not free him from taxation.' 7
The case of the insurance agent illustrates a distinction once recognized.
In situations similar to the Earl case it is uniformly held that the assignor
is still taxable after an assignment of income to be received for services to
be rendered.' 8 A contrary result was formerly reached when the assignment
was of salary or income that had already been earned.19  The assignor may
be taxed in any case if the court finds no purpose for the assignment other
than an obvious effort to escape taxation.20
This brief statement of the results obtaining under various situations shows
the difficulty of fixing with any certainty, by, reference to the Earl and Blair
cases, the dividing line between taxability and nontaxability of the assignor.
The Supreme Court, at the current term, has failed to clarify the general
situation to any marked degree. In Helvering v. Horst, 61 Sup. Ct. 144
(1940), the taxpayer had made a gift of bond interest to his son by detaching
negotiable bond interest coupons and delivering them to him. The Court
decided that the donor remained taxable on the income. In a companion
case, Helvering v. Eubank, 61 Sup. Ct. 149 (1940), an insurance agent had
assigned his future renewal commissions. The Court held that he was still
taxable on this income.
Certain specific results dearly follow from these decisions. The Eubank
'
3 United States v. Spalding, 97 F. (2d)" 701 (C. C. A. 9th 1938) ; Byrnes v. Com-
missiorler, 89 F. (2d) 243 (C. C. A. 3d 1937) ; Edward G. Schwartz, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 69 F. (2d) 633 (C. C. A. 5th 1934) ; Nelson v. Ferguson, 56 F. (2d) 121 (C. C.
A. 3d 1932), cert. denied, 286 U. S. 565, 52 Sup. Ct. 646 (1932) ; Lilienfield v. Commis-
sioner, 35 B. T. A. 391 (1937). Cf. Leydig v. Commissioner, 43 F. (2d) 494 (C. C.
A. 10th 1930) (where royalty agreement was to be executed in the future).
14Hall v. Burnet, 54 F. (2d) 443 (App. D. C. 1931).
'
5 Contra: Van Meter v. Commissioner, 61 F. (2d) 817 (C. C. A. Sth 1932) ; Bishop
v. Commissioner, 54 F. (2d) 298 (C. C. A. 7th 1931).
16Hall v. Burnet, 54 F. (2d) 443, 444 (App. D. C. 1931).
17Parker v. Routzahn, 56 F. (2d) 730 (C. C. A. 6th 1932).
'SBurnet v. Leininger, 285 U. S. 136, 52 Sup. Ct. 345 (1932) ; National Contracting
Co. v. Commissioner, 105 F. (2d) 488 (C. C. A. 8th 1939) ; Emery v. Commissioner,
78 F. (2d) 437 (C. C. A. 1st 1935) ; Rossmoore v. Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 520 (C.
C. A. 2d 1935) ; Daugherty v. Commissioner, 63 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 9th 1933) ; Dickey
v. Burnet, 56 F. (2d) 917 (C. C. A. 8th 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 606, 53 Sup. Ct.
10 (1932). Bid see Helvering v. Seatree, 72 F. (2d) 67 (App. D. C. 1934).
'
9 Commissioner v. Ross, 83 F. (2d) 18 (C. C. A. 6th 1936); Knapp v. Commissioner,
40 B. T. A. 1145 (1939). Cf. cases supra notes 14 and 15.2OGriffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 355, 60 Sup. Ct. 277 (1939); Jones v. Page,
102 F. (2d) 144 (C. C. A. 5th 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 562, 60 Sup. Ct. 93 (1939).
But see Bing v. Bowers, 22 F. (2d) 450 (S. D. N. Y. 1927), aft'd, 26 F. (2d) 1017
(C. C. A. 2d 1928).
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case has finally settled the taxability of assignments of renewal commissions.21
The distinction between assignments of earned and unearned salary and
income seems to have gone by the board.22  The Horst case settles 2 the law
in regard to assignments of bond interest without a transfer of the bond
itself.
Their general effect is less obvious. In Huber v. Helvering,24 the beneficiary
assigned to the corpus of a trust the income for certain years. Thet court
held him taxable on the income. The opinion distinguished the Blair case
on the ground that in that case the beneficiary's entire interest in a part of
the income was assigned, while in the Huber case income for a specified year
only was assigned. Thus the taxpayer did not divest himself of any interest
in the corpus.2 5 More interesting, perhaps, is the concurring opinion of
Chief Justice Groner in which he expresses an opinion that the Blair case
is no longer controlling since the Horst and Eubank decisions. Although it
is doubtful that these decisions have overruled the Blair case, 6 they seem
to have confined it more closely to its facts. It is fairly certain that they
have widened the area of taxability governed by the Earl case.
Richard J. Bookhout
Taxation: Income tax: Husband and wife as a taxable unit.-Ijnder
Section 51 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1934' a husband and wife living to-
gether may each file a separate income tax return; or "the income of each
shall be included in a single joint return, in which case the tax shall be com-
puted on the aggregate income."2 Does this clause, repeated in Section 51 (b)
of the Internal Revenue Code,3 mean that husband and wife become a single
21Jesse Holladay Philbin, 4 Prentice-Hall 1941 Fed. Tax Serv., ff 64,110 (B. T. A.
Dec. 11, 1940) (memo.).22Abraham E. Duran and Hester M. Duran, 4 Prentice-Hall 1941 Fed. Tax Serv.
1 64,124 (B. T. A. Dec. 18, 1940) (memo.).23Rosenwald v. Commissioner, 33 F. (2d) 432 (C. C. A. 7th 1929), cert. denied, 280
U. S. 599, 50 Sup. Ct. 69 (1929),. which reached a contrary result, has apparently been
overruled sub silentio.
244 Prentice-Hall 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 11 62,411k (App. D. C. 1941).
25Compare the reasoning of the court in Schaffner v. Harrison, 113 F. (Zd) 449
(C. C. A. 7th 1940), cert. granted, 61 Sup. Ct. 134 (1940), Docket No. 437, decided
before the Horst and Eubank cases. In that case the taxpayer assigned trust income
for specified years only. It was held that he was not taxable on that income. The
Blair case was followed.26Since the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the Schaffiwr case, cited supra
note 25, it is possible that a definite ruling may be had on the effect of the Horst and
Eubank decisions upon the Blair case. The Schaffner case was argued before the Supreme
Court March 4, 1941. 9 U. S. L. WEE= 3237 (1941).
148 STAT. 697, 26 U. S. C. A. § 51 (1934).2Italics added.
3"(b) Husband and wife.-In the case of a husband and wife living together the in-
come of each'(even though one has no gross income) may be included in a single return
made by them jointly, in which case the tax shall be compurted on the aggregate income,
and the liability with respect to the tax shall be joint and several. No joint return may
be made if either the husband or wife is a nonresident alien." (Italics added).
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taxable unit when they file a joint return? Or does it mean that husband and
wife are to be regarded as separate taxpayers, even when they file a joint
return, and are to be entitled to only that treatment to which either would
have been entitled on a separate return? Suppose that a husband has real-
ized losses on the sale of capital assets,5 and that during the same year, his
wife has realized gains from the sale of capital assets. Upon a joint return,
may they offset the husband's losses against the wife's gains? Again, sup-
pose that a wife contributes more than 15% of her net income to charity and
that her husband makes no charitable contributions at all.' Upon a joint
return, may her contributions in excess of 15% of her net income be de-
ducted up to 15% of the combined net income? The Supreme Court, in Hel-
vering v. Janney7 and Gaines v,. Helvering, 61 Sup. Ct. 241 (1940),8 and in
Taft v. Heivering, 61 Sup. Ct. 244 (1940), 9 has recently answered these ques-
tions in the affirmative.
The Jaitney case overrules the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Pierce v. Conmvissioner'O-a decision which the
First" and Fourth'2 Circuits had reluctantly followed. The Pierce case,
involving facts substantially similar to those in Helvering v. Janney, refused
to allow the losses sustained by a wife in the sale of stock 3 to be offset in a
joint return against the gains realized by her husband from similar transac-
tions. The Second Circuit concluded that when husband and wife file a joint
return, "each is treated as a separate individual who can carry deductions into
the joint return only in his or her own right."" This interpretation of the
4For an excellent study of the problem as it existed prior to the Janney and Taft cases,
herein noted, see Comment, Income Taxatio* of Husband and Wife (1940) 49 YALE
L J. 1279.
547 STAT. 191 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. § 101 (b) (1934). Capital assets at the tirie
of the Janney case were defined as property held by the taxpayer for more than two
years. Compare Section 117 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code, which defines a short-
term capital gain in terms of a capital asset held for not more than 18 months, and a
long-term capital gain in terms of a capital asset held for more than 18 months.
648 STAT. 690, 26 U. S. C. A. § 23 (o) (1934). A taxpayer is allowed to deduct
bona fide charitable contributions up to 15% of his net income. The provision is the
same at the present time. INT. Rxv. CODE § 23 (o) (1939).7Affirming a judgment of the Third Circuit, 108 F. (2d) 564 (C. C. A. 3d 1939),
which reversed an order of the Board of Tax Appeals, 39 B. T. A. 240 (1939).
SReversing a judgment of the Second Circuit, 111 F. (2d) 144 (C. C. A. 2d 1940),
which affirmed an order of the Board of Tax Appeals, 40 B. T. A. 1378 (1939).0Reversing a judgment of the Second Circuit, 111 F. (2d) 145 (C. C. A. 2d 1940),
which affirmed an order of the Board of Tax Appeals, 40 B. T. A. 229 (1939).
10100 F. (2d) 397 (C. C. A. 2d 1938), 121 A. L. R. 647, 650 (1939), noted (1939)
27 GEo. L. J. 1145. Accord: a later Second Circuit case, Demuth v. Commissioner,
100 F. (2d) 1012 (C. C. A. 2d 1938), cert. denied, 307 U. S. 627, 59 Sup. Ct. 822 (1939).
11"While the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit may
involve some doubt we do not regard it as clearly wrong and, being squarely in point,
we follow it." Sweet v. Commissioner, 102 F. (2d) 103, 105 (C. C. A. 1st 1939),
cert. denied, 307 U. S. 627, 59 Sup. Ct. 829 (1939).
Wnfra note 18.
13 While the Pierce case, did not involve capital assets, the Second Circuit decided the
Janney case which did involve capital assets, iupon the strength of the Pierce case. No
distinction seems possible on that ground, in view of the broad language of the Supreme
Court in the Janney case.
14100 F. (Zd) 397, 398 (C. C. A. 2d 1938).
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statutory scheme had been adopted by the Bureau of Internal Revenue 5
and approved by many commentators. 16 Judge Learned Hand dissented,
however, on the basis that Congress, when it provided that "the tax shall be
computed on the aggregate income,"'17 intended thereby to preclude any
tracing of the several sources of the "aggregate income" into the joint return.
His vigorous and persuasive dissenting opinion did much to undermine the
authority of the Pierce case' 8 and probably contributed to its reversal in the
Supreme Court.
Taft v. Helvering is another evidence of the determination of the Supreme
Court to adopt the unit theory of joint returns. The Board of Tax Appeals
had refused to allow a husband and wife filing a joint return to deduct their
combined charitable contributions in computing their aggregate net income.' 9
The Second Circuit had affirmed without opinion upon the authority of the
Pierce case.20  The Supreme Court reversed. It held the question cognate
to that presented in Helvering v. Janzey, and said that the "principle of a
joint return permitted aggregation of income and deductions and thus over-
rode the limitations incident to separate returns."
2
'
That a husband and wife who file a joint income tax return are now a
single taxable unit should provoke no startling social or economic reper-
cussions. Husband and wife may still file separate returns, if they choose.
The grouping together of husband and wife provides a reasonable criterion
of the family's ability to pay.22 Despite the newly acquired power to aggre-
gate incomes and deductions, it still remains true that the joint return in
the higher income brackets will mean a larger tax.
23
Ralph H. German
15The Janzey case upsets U. S. Treas. Reg. 65, Art. 117-5, providing that "the allow-
ance of losses of one spouse from sales or exchanges of capital assets is in all cases
to be computed without regard to the gains or losses of the other spouse upon sales or
exchanges of capital assets."
'
6 Supra note 4; see also Paul and Havens, Husband and Wife under the Income Tax
(1936) 5 BROKLYN L. RV. 241; Reiling, Taxing the Income of Husband and Wije
(1935) 13 TAX MAG. 198.
"Awaiting clarification by Congress, to resolve the statutory ambiguity in the present
case [Helvering v. Janney], the policy of mitigating the tax burden of the family as an
economic unit might be balanced against that of limiting deductions to those specifically
allowed." Note (1940) 53 HARv. L. REv. 681. But compare infra note 23.
17Supra note 2.
18"While a majority of this court are much impressed with the reasoning of Judge
Learned Hand in his dissenting opinion in the Pierce case, the legal question involve&
is a close one and we feel that we should follow the decisions of the First and Second
Circuits, particularly in view of the denials of certiorari by the Supreme Court." Nelson
v. Commissioner, 104 F. (2d) 521 (C. C. A. 4th 1939).
1040 13. T. A. 229 (1939).20111 F. (2d) 145 (C. C. A. 2d 1940).
2161 Sup. Ct. 244, 246 (1940). Taft v. Helvering overrules U. S. Treas. Reg. 86,
Art. 23 (o) requiring each spouse on a joint return to base his or her deduction for
charitable contributions solely upon his or her separate net income. The writer under-
stands that the Commissioner has acquiesced in this new conception of husband and wife
as a single taxable unit.22Reiling, supra note 16.
23
"Under a progressive 'scale the result [in a joint return] is a larger tax than if
some part of the combined income were reported separately. Certain special features in
the tax law may produce a smaller tax under the joint return, as when losses of a
certain type can be offset against gains of the same type, and one spouse has the losses
while the other has the gains." Shoup, Married Persons Compared with Single Persons
under the Income Tax (1940) 25 BULL. NAT. TAX. Ass'N 130.
1941)
